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Abstract 
 
This thesis comprises a literature review, a research paper and a critical review of the 
research process. 
In the literature review, a metasynthesis method was used to identify and synthesise 
12 studies that explored experiences of psychiatric diagnosis. Four themes emerged; ‘the 
diagnostic experience: problems with validity and utility’; ‘reaction to diagnosis: devastation 
and hope’; ‘personal experience: impact on self’; and ‘interpersonal experience: relationships 
and identity’. Findings are discussed in terms of the impact of diagnosis on self and identity 
and suggest that there are both positive and negative aspects to diagnosis. Working with 
diagnosis and psychological formulation in mental health practice is considered, focusing on 
ameliorating the negative and preserving the positive aspects of diagnosis. 
The study presented in the research paper used a grounded theory methodology, 
where ten participants who were practitioners in adult mental health services in the National 
Health Service in England were interviewed, to develop a theory that explained how 
diagnosis was used in practice. The core category ‘needing a certain foundation for practice’ 
was constructed from the data, with two further categories; ‘holding and coping with 
inconsistent and differing views’ and ‘impact on practice: depersonalisation and not 
challenging diagnosis’. Findings suggest that diagnosis has survived because for some it 
provides a secure base for practice and for others the power dynamics inherent in working in 
a system predicated on diagnosis and the perceived lack of utility of diagnosis, make 
challenging it unappealing. Critical consideration of all frameworks used to understand 
distress is encouraged and findings are discussed in relation to attachment and cognitive 
theories. 
The critical review discusses further findings about the role of psychology and power. 
 
Then, reflections are offered about epistemology, using grounded theory methodology and 
conducting research when practising clinically. 
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Section One: Literature Review 
 
How do people experience and make sense of psychiatric diagnoses attributed to 
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Background: There is debate about psychiatric diagnostic criteria and their applications for 
 
people who have been labeled using diagnosis. An accumulated body of qualitative research 
explores the experience of living with diagnosis. 
Aims: The aim of this metasynthesis was to identify and synthesise that qualitative research. 
Method: A systematic search of qualitative articles was conducted using five databases, 
identifying 12 studies that met the inclusion/exclusion criteria. These articles were 
synthesised according to the method of Noblit and Hare (1988). 
Results: Four themes emerged from the metasynthesis; the diagnostic experience: problems 
with validity and utility; reaction to diagnosis: devastation and hope; personal experience: 
impact on self; and interpersonal experience: relationships and identity. These themes 
interact to make up the experience of diagnosis. 
Conclusions: Diagnosis creates some positive and some negative experiences. Findings are 
discussed in terms of the impact of diagnosis on self and identity. Working with diagnosis 
and psychological formulation in mental health practice is considered, with a focus on 
ameliorating the negative and preserving the positive aspects of diagnosis. 
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The recent publication of the updated fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders ([DSM-5] American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013) has sparked 
international debate in academic literature about the challenges of using psychiatric 
diagnosis in mental health practice (Bracken et al., 2012; Ben-Zeev, Young & Corrigan, 
2010). Despite this controversy, in developed countries such as Australia (Commonwealth 
Government of Australia, 2013) and the United States of America ([USA] Probst, 2013) a 
diagnosis is required to gain access to funding for treatments and services. Prevalence rates 
suggest that 5.7% of the population in the USA (Kessler et al., 2005) and 3% in Australia 
(Fourth National Mental Health Plan Working Group, 2009) live with psychiatric diagnoses. 
In the United Kingdom (UK), the Office of National Statistics (ONS) state that one in 
four people will experience a diagnosable mental health problem in any one year (ONS, 
2001). In the UK, psychiatric diagnoses are made by mental health professionals, using the 
International Classification of Diseases 10 ([ICD-10], World Health Organization, 1992) 
and the DSM-5 (APA, 2013). Research into the reliability of the third edition of the DSM 
([DSM-III]; APA, 1980), which analysed data collected from DSM-III field trials, has 
shown that experienced clinicians only agree on a broad diagnostic category 50% of the 
time (Kirk & Kutchins, 1994). 
Diagnostic Debate 
 
These diagnostic systems raise wide reaching debate and controversy, particularly in 
relation to the validity of psychiatric diagnosis (herein referred to simply as diagnosis), 
within psychiatry itself (Bracken et al., 2012) and beyond, particularly in psychology 
(Pilgrim, 2007) and service user movements (Weitz, 2013). However, research suggests that 
mental health professionals value diagnosis as a common language but acknowledge its 
contested validity and associated stigma (Stalker, Ferguson & Barclay, 2005). Mental health 
problems are stereotypically associated with stigmatising beliefs about weakness and 




deviance, which can be internalised as beliefs about self that are consistent with such stigma 
(Warner, 1994). 
Due to the pejorative effects of psychiatric labels, this paper will refer to ‘people in 
 
receipt of a psychiatric diagnosis’ (PRPD), to describe those who have been labeled using 
 
diagnostic systems. It is hoped that this term will avoid, as far as possible, assumptions 
 
about the internal worlds of those who participated in the synthesised research. This is also 
 
in line with British Psychological Society (BPS) publications, which attempt to “use terms 
 
which are as neutral as possible and do not imply a particular ‘framework of 
 




In 2013, the BPS Division of Clinical Psychology (DCP) released a statement about 
the shifting paradigm of diagnosis in mental health (BPS, 2013). This was in response to the 
publication of the latest version of the DSM-5 (APA, 2013) and states that rather than using 
reductive diagnostic categories as set out in the DSM-5, clinical psychologists (CPs) and 
other mental health professionals should develop a framework for understanding distress 
based on understanding human experience, moving beyond the disease model. They 
commissioned a working party to make recommendations about alternatives to diagnosis 
(still anticipated at the time of writing). Research by Evans et al. (2013) examining 
psychologists’ views and practices regarding diagnostic systems, in 23 countries, showed 
that 60% used a formal classification system (ICD-10 or DSM-IV) in routine practice. These 
psychologists preferred more flexible diagnostic guidelines and used diagnosis to inform 
treatment decisions and facilitate communication with PRPD and other professionals. 
Psychologists outside Europe and the USA identified problems with applicability of criteria 
in other cultures. 
Medical professionals are better represented than psychologists and other professions 




in research examining views on and use of diagnostic systems. Mellsop and colleagues used 
the same survey method to analyse views of psychiatrists in New Zealand (Mellsop, Dutu, 
& Robinson, 2007), Brazil and Japan (Mellsop et al., 2007). The same survey method was 
used in the USA (Bell, Sowers, & Thompson, 2008), as well as with primary care 
physicians, psychiatrists and psychologists in New Zealand (Mellsop, Lutchman, Lillis, & 
Dutu, 2011). Consistently, clinicians used the DSM over other systems and valued diagnosis 
for offering a shared language and to aid care planning. When asked what they need from a 
classification system, participants reported that they would favour a more reliable system 
with fewer categories. 
Other professional groups also report some issues working with these systems. 
 
Research suggests that nurses in New Zealand use diagnosis to inform treatment plans, 
communicate difficulties to PRPD and their families and for statistical monitoring for their 
service (Aitchison & Mellsop, 2010). However, they felt that diagnostic systems did not 
allow for cultural or alternative explanations of difficulties and that labelling hindered 
recovery, meaning diagnosis was not in line with nursing values. Social workers in the USA 
also reported feeling that their values and ethical practices were compromised working 
within diagnostic systems (Probst, 2013; Hitchens & Becker, 2014). Despite these 
professionals’ views, diagnostic systems prevail in mental health practice. 
Existing Qualitative Research 
 
Qualitative research gathering the experiences of individuals who have been 
diagnosed is particularly important given the lack of voice they have within the mental 
health system; for example PRPD are not consulted on revisions of the DSM series (Frese, 
2010). 
Some lived experience research contributes to debates about the utility of diagnosis 
for PRPD and how well diagnosis explains participants’ experiences. For example, Castillo 




(2000) explored the experiences of people who have been diagnosed with personality 
disorder and found that 86% conceptualised their difficulties in terms of anxiety, depression 
or both, suggesting their experience of distress differs from its diagnostic description. Sayre 
(2000), in a grounded theory exploration of how individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia 
view their situations, found that participants who were in hospital rejected the psychiatric 
definition of their distress. 
Often, qualitative research aiming to explore the experiences of PRPD includes 
findings relating to the experience of living with a diagnosis. For example, Lilja and Hellzén 
(2008) qualitatively explored experiences of psychiatric care in Sweden and found their 
participants regretted the permanency of diagnosis when they were no longer experiencing 
distress. LaFrance (2007), in a study of participants’ accounts of depression, found that 
diagnosis offered validation. A Canadian study of women who had recovered from 
psychosis found that diagnosis was destructive for the individual, given the lack of hope for 
recovery associated with diagnostic labels (Hagen & Nixon, 2011). A UK based interpretive 
phenomenological analysis study of service users’ experiences of early intervention in 
psychosis services found that service users developed their own framework for 
understanding their distress beyond that offered by the service, which reflected a 
psychosocial understanding (Harris, Collinson & das Nair, 2012). While these are useful 
findings, they represent findings of larger qualitative studies whose aims were to explore 
experiences of distress and not diagnosis. 
A smaller body of literature has focused on the experience of being labeled using 
psychiatric diagnosis and subsequently living with a diagnosis, attempting to separate out 
the effects of living with distress and living with a label (e.g. Howe, Tickle & Brown, 2014; 
Black, Thornicroft & Murray, 2013). Giles and Newbold (2011) explored the use of 
diagnosis in online mental health communities, finding that diagnosis was desired to allow 




forum users to feel part of the group identity of individuals with the same diagnosis and was 
used as proof of their distress. As Hayne (2003) asserts, it is important to recognise “the 
distinctness of diagnosis as a phenomenon of the illness experience” (p. 722). It is this body 
of literature that is the focus of this metasynthesis. 
The Current Metasynthesis 
 
Metasynthesis is an interpretative analysis of qualitative studies, which creates a 
synthesis of those studies, grounded in empirical data (Shaw, 2012). The aim is to increase 
the utility of the findings of the studies featured and the stories told by their participants. 
With the established body of qualitative research investigating experience of diagnosis for 
PRPD and the controversy surrounding the use of diagnosis in policy and practice, 
metasynthesis seemed timely and useful. The aim was to create a synthesised understanding 
of the experience of diagnosis from multiple studies. 
Noblit and Hare’s (1988) metaethnographic method is the most commonly cited 
approach to metasynthesis used in published metasyntheses (Bondas & Hall, 2007) and was 
used in this metasynthesis. This method was selected because it was considered to meet the 
aim, which was to explore the contribution of the collection of studies as a whole and 
produce higher order themes, preserving the interpretations of participants’ original 
accounts. The metaethnography process achieves this through comparison of the findings of 
original studies, allowing similarities and differences in findings to be explored. 
This metasynthesis is conducted from a social constructionist stance, acknowledging 
that the themes found are the author’s construction of participants’ experiences of diagnosis, 
based on the research findings of the studies included in the metasynthesis, and there is no 
ultimate truth to be uncovered (Creswell & Miller, 2000). 






Diagnosis and Research 
 
As discussed, the DCP made a recent statement questioning the validity of diagnosis 
and suggesting that CPs use less stigmatising frameworks for understanding human 
experience (BPS, 2013). However, most qualitative research exploring the experiences of 
PRPD is predicated on diagnosis, for example, studies that claim to explore the experience 
of participants diagnosed with obsessive compulsive disorder (Murphy & Perera-Delcourt, 
2012) and bipolar disorder (Inder et al., 2008). The majority of papers in this metasynthesis 
can also be characterised in this way, however this metasynthesis explores the experience of 
diagnosis as a construct and does not just explore the experience of those who are 
considered to fall into a single diagnostic category. This is because the aim of this 
metasynthesis is to explore the phenomenon of diagnosis; regardless of the category 
ascribed to participants. However, the influence of individual diagnostic categories was not 
ignored in the process of synthesis. 
Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria 
 
Articles that met the following criteria were included in the metasynthesis: used adult 
participants and focused on the experience of adults; explored the experience of psychiatric 
diagnosis; used qualitative methods and reported qualitative data; published in a peer-
reviewed journal to give an initial judgment of quality; included data from PRPD and where 
data were included from, for example, service providers or carers, data and themes from 
PRPD were clearly distinguished; published in English (to avoid the prohibitive cost of 
translation); provided analysis of first-hand experiences of PRPD with participant quotations 
included in the article; offered interpretive, inductive analysis. 
Given the lack of research in this area and this metasynthesis being the first attempt to 
review this literature, the decision was made to include articles that used a range of 




methodologies and epistemologies, where an inductive, interpretive method was used, to 
allow a full representation of qualitative research in the area. Papers that did not use an 
inductive approach were excluded. For example, a study by Giles and Newbold (2011) was 
excluded, after the full paper was read, because although it explored diagnosis in online 
communities it did not take an inductive approach. Using conversation analysis, data were 




Literature searches took place up to 9th January 2015. The search terms in Table 1 
were generated from the APA and EBSCO host thesauruses and were used to search the 
databases, in the quest for a high recall and high precision search strategy (Buckland & Gey, 
1994). 




Five databases were searched with the terms mentioned above. No date restrictions 
were imposed. PsychInfo was searched using advanced search option, ‘Boolean search’ and 
‘peer-reviewed journals’ selected. PubMed, CINAHL, Web of Science, and Academic Search 
Complete were also searched, with similar search strategies. Figure 1 shows a flowchart of 
article selection (adapted from Cairns, 2014). When narrowing down the search, duplicates 
 
were removed and then titles of all papers yielded by the search were read. The majority of 
 
these papers were quantitative and this was clear from the title. Where it was not clear from 
 
the title whether the paper was relevant or not, usually in the case of qualitative papers in the 
 
search, the abstract was read to determine relevance. For example, it was unclear from the 
 
title whether a paper by Rogers and Dunne (2011) explored the experience of having a 
 
diagnosis of ‘personality disorder’, however on reading the abstract it was clear that the 




focus of the paper was inpatient experience. The author is confident that all relevant papers 
 
were retrieved, given that the search strategy was developed using comprehensive thesauri, 
 
with the support of a specialist librarian. It was also clear from hand searching reference 
 
lists of included studies that there were no references discovered, other than that indicated in 
 
Figure 1, in addition to the systematic searches of databases. 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
Characteristics of Studies 
 
Twelve articles met the inclusion/exclusion criteria; see Table 2 for a summary of 
their characteristics. Six studies took place in the UK, three in New Zealand, two in 
Australia, one in Canada and one in the USA. There were 207 participants across the 
studies. The participant age range was 23-79 years. Participants were recruited from a range 
of sources: research networks, doctors’ surgeries and mental health, forensic and inpatient 
services. 




The Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP) tool (Public Health Research Unit 
[PHRU], 2006) was used to evaluate the reporting quality of the articles (see Table 3 for 
scores). This evaluation was used to allow for critical consideration of the reporting quality 
of the articles, not to exclude them based on scores, because there is no consensus on 
markers of quality in qualitative research (Sandelowski & Barroso, 2003) and limits on what 
is reported can be imposed, for example by journal guidelines. 
CASP was used with a four point rating scale, adapted from that used by Duggleby et 
al. (2010) and by Murray and Forshaw (2013). The first two questions of the CASP are for 
screening purposes, asking that there is a clear statement of aims for the research and that a 
qualitative methodology is appropriate; all articles met these screening criteria. In this 




framework zero points were awarded where a particular issue was not reported on, one point 
where there was little explanation, two points where some explanation was given but not 
elaborated (for example it mentions ethical approval was granted but does not elaborate) and 
three points were awarded where full explanation was given. A sample of articles and CASP 
scores were audited by a peer to consider consistency in the application of the CASP tool 
and where there were inconsistencies, scores were negotiated to come to consensus. 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Analysis and Synthesis 
 
The method followed the steps of Noblit and Hare (1988). The first two stages have 
been described above; identifying a research question and carrying out literature searches. 
Step three- first reading of articles. Articles were read, recording contextual 
details such as sample and settings, to collate Table 2 and allow comparison. The articles 
were analysed by order of publication, with awareness that the order in which articles are 
read can influence the analysis (Noblit & Hare, 1988). Themes, subthemes and quotations 
illuminating the themes, which were relevant to the research question, were selected from 
each article and written on Post-It notes. 
Step four- deciding how the studies are related to each other. This involved 
understanding the themes drawn out of each article and making initial judgments about how 
these were related to those from the other articles. The Post-It notes were placed on flipchart 
paper (Appendix 1-B), moving them around throughout the second reading to group them 
into emerging themes. 
Step five- translating studies into one another. This step was a continuation of 
working toward interpreting themes within and between articles, “translating the 
interpretations of one study into the interpretations of another” (Noblit & Hare, 1988, p. 32). 
Crucial to this was checking that the themes and concepts represented the themes of the 




original articles and these themes were similar enough to be included in the same 
synthesised themes. Post-Its were moved around the flipchart to gather a sense of the story 
or process represented in each theme. 
Step six- synthesising themes into higher order themes that preserve and 
represent the meaning in the individual studies. Concepts were examined for how well 
they captured the original themes within each article. Table 4 was created to allow tracking 
of theme development and checking that the overall themes represented the authors’ original 
themes. 
Step seven- expressing the synthesis. This article was created to write up the 
findings. Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic reviews and Meta-Analyses ([PRISMA] 
Moher, Liberat, Tetzlaff, Altman, 2009) guidelines were referred to when writing up this 
study, to consider quality of reporting, given that no such guidelines exist for reporting 
metasyntheses. For example, including a flow chart to show the screening process in the 
literature searches (Figure 1). 
Findings 
 
Across 12 articles, four themes were identified to represent the experience of 
diagnosis for PRPD. Each theme contains subthemes, describing how diagnosis operates 
within these themes. Interactions between themes and subthemes are discussed throughout. 
Participant quotations are provided to illuminate the findings; where provided, pseudonyms 
used in original studies are reported. Table 4 shows which themes from the original articles 
were synthesised into the themes presented here and Figure 2 gives a diagrammatic 
representation of themes. 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
FIGURE 2 HERE 




The Diagnostic Experience: Questioning Validity and Utility 
 
The first theme represents the experience of the diagnostic process. Participants were 
mostly critical of this process, many struggling to identify their own experience in the 
diagnostic categories attributed to them and finding a lack of transparency and explanation 
from professionals. Most papers recounted experiences of multiple diagnoses being given or 
changes made to diagnoses. These experiences often led participants to question how valid 
and useful diagnoses were. 
Lack of fit and lack of utility. Participants described how diagnosis was presented 
to them by professionals as fact; Andrea was told “this is definitely what you have, we are 
100% sure” (Horn, Johnstone, & Brooke, 2007, p. 261) with little transparency about how 
diagnoses were reached; “I don’t know how they diagnosed me” (Paul in Howe et al., 2014, 
p. 151). Carol could not see the relevance of diagnosis to her own personal experience (“it 
was just a name, it didn’t really mean much”, Horn et al., 2007, p. 261). The labels 
themselves were associated with derogation; “it’s a horrible term for someone”, says Sandra 
about personality disorder, and Margaret suggests the personality disorder label does not 
accurately describe her distress; “I think it should be changed to something to do with 
feelings and emotions” (Stalker et al., 2005, p. 365). 
This lack of personal resonance, which other participants noted, led them to question 
the utility of a label imposed by others; for example one participant stated “I don’t think it 
gave me anything constructive” (Hayne, 2003, p. 726). Conversely, Robert expressed that 
for him diagnosis was an accurate naming that did not cause distress; “I don’t see any 
problem because that is exactly what I suffer from” (Stalker et al., 2005, p. 365). 
Professionals were reported to consider PRPD not seeing the personal significance 
of diagnosis as denial or lack of insight but one participant in Moeke-Maxwell, Wells and 
Mellsop (2008, p. 10) suggested that education about how diagnosis fits personally can 




encourage ownership of it; “if you feel like you own it, then you’re going to accept it”. 
However there was some suggestion that professionals were inconsistent in their 
explanations of diagnoses (“they think it’s some kind of chemical imbalance in the brain 
[…] but they can’t explain it”; Howe et al., 2014, p. 156). There was also a sense that those 
fitting the “textbook” definitions of diagnoses received better treatment, because 
professionals felt more confident dealing with those people (Gary in Horn et al., 2007, p. 
262). 
 
Questions about the applicability of the diagnosis were ongoing, with one participant 
stating “when I’m normal that’s when I find it hard to accept that I’ve got it” (Inder et al., 
2010 p.101), suggesting that absence of symptoms causes confusion about the permanency 
of diagnosis. Barbara also expressed this confusion by saying, “it is a permanent thing. But I 
actually find that sometimes I am better” (Stalker et al., 2005, p.363). 
Multiple and changing diagnoses. Participants spoke about diagnoses being 
changed by professionals over time; this “flip flopping between” (Milton & Mullan, 2014, p. 
5) understandably caused confusion and led to questioning the validity of these diagnoses 
(whether they accurately represented their distress), losing faith in services and the 
diagnostic system; “it comes to the point where you think, ‘ok I’m not going to believe in 
your diagnosis’” (Moeke-Maxwell et al., 2008, p. 10). The distress caused by changing a 
diagnosis was clear; one participant discussed how new diagnoses and new medications 
came with new psychiatrists and how those changes “tore my world apart” (Moeke- 
Maxwell et al., 2008, p. 10). 
Reaction to Receiving the Diagnosis: Devastation and Hope 
 
This theme describes participants’ initial reactions to receiving a diagnosis, which 
was in some ways devastating but also instilled some hope and offered a sense of relief. 




Legitimisation and containment. A strong subtheme was an initial feeling that 
diagnosis legitimises the distress experienced by PRPD as medical, real and not their fault 
(Pitt, Kilbride, Welford, Nothard & Morrison, 2009), which feels containing for them 
because they then feel like those problems can be treated with medication. One participant 
described their initial response to diagnosis; “yes I know what’s wrong with me. Now I 
might be able to fix it” (Moeke-Maxwell et al., 2008, p. 3). It was a process of making their 
illness evident, validating their previous experiences or symptoms as not normal, and 
allowing the treatment phase to begin. Having a name for their difficulties was important; 
“if you can name it, you can claim it, you can tame it” (Hayne, 2003, p. 727). Those who 
identified with the diagnosis felt that it offered a useful framework for explaining their 
distress, indicating an interaction with the lack of fit and utility subtheme; where diagnosis 
did not fit with experience it offered less opportunity for legitimisation and containment. 
This reaction was mostly evident for people who had struggled to access services 
and diagnosis, with one participant explaining that it was “a relief” to finally know what was 
wrong (Pitt et al., 2009, p. 421). For some participants relief came when they were able to 
access services due to diagnosis. However, as the next subtheme attests, diagnosis providing 
a means of access to services was not straightforward. 
Hope that diagnosis was a means to access services. Diagnosis creating a means to 
access services was dependent on diagnostic category. For some, particularly those 
diagnosed with psychosis, it gave them access to services, which had often been denied pre- 
diagnosis; Paul said “it’s nice to get [the diagnosis] because then you get help” (Howe et al., 
2014, p. 157). 
However, for those diagnosed with personality disorders, a diagnosis often meant 
exclusion from services. During the reading of papers, it was hypothesised that for the UK 
studies, this would be a finding of older studies, published before the release of the National 




Institute of Mental Health’s (2003) paper insisting that people diagnosed with personality 
disorder should no longer be excluded from mental health services, aiming to improve 
outcomes and quality of life. However, experiencing exclusion and stigma as a result of this 
diagnosis continued to be evident in papers as late as Black et al. (2013). 
Unfortunately, for those diagnosed with personality disorders, the diagnosis was 
pejorative and felt like “being labeled and judged versus diagnosed and treated” (Nehls, 
1999, p. 288). One participant felt like a “burden to everyone” (Brenda, Horn et al., 2007, p. 
261), suggesting that this rejection is internalised. This subtheme indicates that the 
individual perception of hope after diagnosis can interact with the more negative social and 
service context. 
Devastation, hopelessness and shame. Many participants spoke about feeling 
distress, in addition to and separate from the distress linked to their mental health issues, in 
response to diagnosis. Where participants spoke about their reactions to diagnosis, the 
language used was emotive; one participant spoke about feeling “devastated” (Moeke- 
Maxwell et al., 2008, p. 9).  A participant in Nehls’ (1999) study spoke about being given a 
diagnosis as “like a knife to the heart”, leaving a feeling that “life as I knew it just had 
completely ended” (p. 725). Being given a diagnosis with a lack of information further 
increased hopelessness. 
Some participants had internalised societal narratives about people with mental 
health problems, which meant that they applied those narratives to themselves when the 
diagnosis was made; “I just thought schizophrenic people go around murdering and raping 
people […] I’m not schizophrenic, you know what I mean” (Pitt et al., 2009, p. 421). Lack 
of opportunity to discuss diagnosis increased reliance on already internalised narratives; 
Maureen stated “no one has ever explained it [her diagnosis] to me” (Stalker et al., 2005, p. 
365) and one participant spoke of an “increasing reluctance to use names of diseases” 




(Milton & Mullen, 2014, p. 4), which seemed to contribute to the lack of discussion about 
diagnosis. Lack of discussion about how diagnosis fits with personal experience was 
identified as a problem in the lack of fit and lack of utility subtheme; it seems here that not 
understanding how diagnosis fits with their experiences led some participants to react 
negatively to it and experience it as destroying a sense of hope. 
Personal Experience: Impact on Self 
 
This theme explores the impact of diagnosis on the sense of self and later the identity 
and diagnosis subtheme explores its impact on identity. Although these concepts are 
difficult to define, here, the self is considered a cognitive and affective (Heatherton, Krendl, 
Macrae & Kelley, 2007) “representation or set of representations about oneself, parallel to 
the representations people have of other individuals” (Swann & Bosson, 2010, p. 591). The 
self holds the representation of one’s identity, which is formed through identifications with 
significant others (caregivers, groups) who we might positively identify with and aspire to 
be like, or wish to disassociate from (Weinrich, 2003). Therefore self is our internal 
representation of who we are and identity is our understanding and subjective experience of 
how the self operates in a social context, in relation to others. The metasynthesis revealed 
that, for some, diagnosis caused the loss of an established sense of self, with the subsequent 
rebuilding of narratives about self. 
Losing who I am. Some participants described how diagnosis assaulted their 
established sense of self; as Kevin described “it was like breaking a glass” (Hayne. 2003, p. 
725), leaving participants feeling that they no longer knew themselves and yearning for their 
sense of self pre-diagnosis. One participant described “coming to terms with the loss of who 
I am, and that I sometimes feel I cannot be the person I once thought I was” (Proudfoot et 
al., 2009, p. 125). This sense of deconstruction was palpable and emotive, with Irene 
describing feeling “like a newborn child” (Hayne, 2003, p. 726). This loss of self seemed to 




be in response to the naming of distress using diagnosis; “when they name the mental illness 
it denies you a being” (Irene, Hayne, 2003, p. 726). For Sandra, diagnosis of personality 
disorder suggested a fundamental flaw in her representation of herself; “there is something 
wrong with my personality and it is disordered in some way” (Stalker et al., 2005, p. 363). 
Rebuilding narrative: past and present. As a response to diagnosis, some 
participants had to reattribute their history and their past sense of self, according to their 
label. There were similarities here to the subtheme legitimisation and containment; 
participants felt that the label helped them make sense of previous difficulties; “I can see 
now with my money problems and the way I sort of behaved in the past. Definitely not 
normal” (Inder et al., 2010, p. 160). This went beyond legitimising and finding explanations 
for past experiences and behaviours; there was a sense that some participants reframed their 
entire lives through the lens of diagnosis, internalising it as an explanation. For example, a 
participant in the Delmas, Proudfoot, Parker and Manicavasagar study described this as 
“[…] like a totally new framework, like you had always been speaking English and now you 
will be speaking Chinese […] It’s always been Chinese you just thought you spoke English. 
I’ve had to recode all my past experiences” (2011, p. 921). 
Rebuilding the narrative of the past seemed to be a positive experience for some 
participants but led to a negative narrative about self in the present. A participant spoke 
about developing a persistent acceptance that they would never be normal, always 
“defective” (Delmas et al., 2011, p. 137) and disliking their new self; “I hate the person I’ve 
become” (Proudfoot et al., 2009, p. 126). The perceived “permanency” (Danielle in Milton 
& Mullan, 2014, p. 263) of diagnosis suggests that this change in self is permanent. Belief in 
a part of the self that was not about their distress was protective for one participant; Ben 
attests “I’m pretty normal in most ways” (Howe et al., 2014, p. 156). 




Interpersonal Experience: Relationships and Identity 
 
Many participants discussed how others reacted to them, often applying stigmatising 
beliefs, resulting in them learning not to disclose their diagnosis, which led to isolation. 
Here, stigma is considered to be a social construction, which defines and devalues people 
according to certain characteristics, for example experiencing distress (Dovidio, Major & 
Crocker, 2000). As noted earlier, participants felt shame based on their internalised views 
about mental health difficulties. This theme explores how participants felt shame based on 
others’ reactions to them and their diagnosis, how these experiences impacted on their 
identity and the way they communicated their distress to others. 
Stigma, non-disclosure and isolation. One participant spoke of feeling stigmatised 
as incompetent and “subnormal” (Janet in Howe et al., 2014, p. 156). There was some 
difference according to diagnosis, with PRPD diagnosed with personality disorders feeling 
judged as dependent, overly emotional and manipulative (e.g. Horn et al., 2007; Nehls, 
1999), and people diagnosed with psychosis feeling judged as violent (e.g. Howe et al., 
1999). Because of this stigma, many participants did not wish to disclose their diagnosis to 
friends, family members, employers, members of the public and sometimes mental health 
professionals; “I’ve learned from experience not to give that diagnosis […] because it just 
has a lot of negative ramifications” (Nehls, 1999, p. 288). This fear of stigma led to non- 
disclosure, which led to isolation and not getting the help they needed. One participant had 
learned this the hard way after disclosing their diagnosis; “I lost all my friends… yes I lost 
them all” (Pitt et al., 2009, p. 421). 
Identity and diagnosis. Where participants spoke about how they project 
themselves into the world, accepting diagnosis as a part of their identity and not its totality 
seemed to have positive consequences; “I always say schizophrenia, not ‘a schizophrenic’, 
you happen to have schizophrenia, but you’re a human being first, with a life and dreams 




and goals” (Milton & Mullan, 2014). Some participants hoped that others would also view 
them in this way; Carol expressed a preference for others to “treat you as a person, rather 
than a diagnosis” (Horn et al., 2007, p. 203). Participants preferred to be treated holistically 
by professionals; “some would treat the illness, some would treat the person, and the ones 
that treated the person would have better outcomes” (Milton & Mullen, 2014, p. 4). 
Allowing the label to define identity (being a “schizophrenic”, Pitt et al., 2009, p. 421) 
hindered recovery. 
Summary of themes 
 
The themes above indicate that the experience of being diagnosed, as explored in the 
diagnostic experience theme, caused some participants to question how much their 
diagnosis applied to them and therefore question the utility of their diagnosis (lack of fit and 
lack of utility). Having a diagnosis changed (multiple and changing diagnoses) led to further 
questioning of fit and utility and left some participants feeling confused and questioning the 
utility of diagnosis. The emotional response to diagnosis was explored in the reaction to 
receiving the diagnosis theme, which suggested that for some, diagnosis offered 
legitimisation and containment because it offered a name for their distress and a framework 
within which to understand and manage it. Some of this containment came from the hope 
that diagnosis was a means to access services, however this was not a straightforward 
process for all participants. A very different emotional reaction reported by some 
participants was devastation, hopelessness and shame, often because diagnosis activated 
internalised, negative societal narratives associated with their diagnosis. 
The personal experience: impact on self theme indicated that some participants felt 
that they lost an established sense of self (losing who I am), and some went through a 
process of rebuilding the narrative of their life, through the lens of their diagnosis, making 
alternative attributions and explanations for some life events and difficulties. This rebuilding 




of the past led to incorporating diagnosis into their sense of self in the present, which was 
overwhelmingly negative. 
Participants’ interpersonal experience of diagnosis incorporated their relationships 
and identity. In the stigma, non-disclosure and isolation subtheme, participants discussed 
experiencing stigma as a result of their diagnosis, or at least perceiving stigma, which 
resulted in non-disclosure of their diagnosis and sometimes their difficulties, leading to 
isolation and not getting appropriate support. The identity and diagnosis subtheme suggests 
that some participants accepted diagnosis as part but not all of their identity and wished to 
be seen holistically. 
It is important to note that a linear process cannot be derived from this 
metasynthesis, for example it cannot be determined that all participants went through an 
experience of losing their established self (losing who I am) and then started to rebuild that 
sense of self (rebuilding self). Rather, the findings indicate that the experiences denoted in 
the themes were pertinent for some participants and indicate potential reactions to diagnosis 
and how that diagnosis might operate in personal and interpersonal domains. 
Discussion 
 
The aim was to synthesise qualitative research exploring the experience of diagnosis. 
 
The understandings about diagnosis found in this metasynthesis are elaborated on in this 
discussion, suggesting ways to move towards an approach that preserves the positive 
consequences of diagnosis and compensates for its negative impact. 
The Self and Identity 
 
Research suggests that sense of self is shattered when distress is experienced and the 
rebuilding of an enduring sense of self is an important part of recovery (Davidson & Strauss, 
1992; Young & Ensing, 1999). Other research suggests that an enduring sense of self is 
reshaped, rather than shattered, when an individual experiences distress (Romano, McCay, 




Goering, Boydell & Zipursky, 2010). In this reshaping or rebuilding, developing a 
perspective that distress is simply one part of the self promotes recovery (Davidson, 
O’Connell, Tondora, Lawless, Evans, 2005). However, current findings suggest an 
overwhelmingly negative impact of diagnosis on self. 
The findings of this metasynthesis suggest that the naming of distress (diagnosis) 
could impact on sense of self, separate to the experience of distress. Sense of self is 
shattered as a result of diagnosis (losing who I am subtheme) and sense of self in both the 
past and present must be rebuilt according to diagnosis (rebuilding the narrative). Inder et 
al. (2008) suggest that, for people diagnosed with bipolar disorder, incorporating bipolar 
disorder into their sense of self was vital in terms of moving on and accepting their ‘illness’. 
However, these results (rebuilding the narrative) suggest that this can be a negative process, 
as rebuilding a sense of self based on diagnosis led to a negative sense of self. 
Research suggests that experiencing distress impacts on identity and leads to the re- 
development of that identity, but no clear model about how this happens exists (Wisdom, 
Bruce, Saedi, Weis & Green, 2008). These findings show that identity was sometimes 
altered to include diagnosis as part of it and this was a positive process for some (identity 
and diagnosis), when others also accepted it as only part of that person’s identity. 
This suggests that diagnosis has a negative impact when it is incorporated into an 
individual’s sense of self, but it can be positive when incorporated into identity. Distinctions 
between self and identity in the literature seem blurred but these findings can be best 
understood within systemic theorising about self. Systemic theory considers self to be 
relational, fluid and bought into existence by the narratives used to describe it, with self 
being limited by the opportunities and social environment of the individual (Flaskas, 2002). 
Identity is created by the constancy of these narratives (Anderson, 1997) and therefore it 
makes sense that a change in these narratives, for example introducing diagnosis, would 




impact self (by offering alternative narratives for understanding past behaviour and present 
self) and identity (by challenging the constancy of existing narratives). 
The key difference in the findings about self and the findings about identity was that 
participants seemed to enter into the process of rebuilding the narratives about self alone, 
accessing internal narratives, whereas changes in identity were about interactions with 
others. Therefore, here, when a person understands self individually, diagnosis has an 
overwhelmingly negative impact. However, when they start to consider their identity, in 
relation to and with others, where others support them to see diagnosis as only part of that 
identity, this is a positive experience. Therefore the interpersonal experience of diagnosis is 
important. 
Implications for Practice. If diagnosis leads to questioning sense of self (losing who 
I am), rebuilding the narrative of life and trying to incorporate diagnosis into identity, it is 
pertinent to think about approaches that might facilitate this as a positive process. One 
approach that would allow understanding of experiences without imposing frameworks is 
narrative therapy (Morgan, 2000), where the practitioner sits in the ‘not-knowing’ position 
(Anderson & Goulishian, 1992) and shows curiosity about the life story of the client. The 
use of a narrative approach for PRPD has been discussed previously (Kirkpatrick, 2008) and 
could offer a way for PRPD to understand their experiences within a framework they have 
co-created with a therapist, which would not exclude medical frameworks. 
It is important for practitioners to be aware of a person’s reaction to their diagnosis 
and how they make sense of it. Cognitive Analytic Therapy ([CAT], Ryle, 1997) makes use 
of Vygotsky’s (1978) concept, zone of proximal development (ZPD), which suggests that 
new learning can only take place when new information or skills to be learned are close 
enough to but different enough from a person’s current perceptions. This highlights the 
importance of understanding the views of PRPD so that any work with their understanding 




of distress is within their ZPD (which may include diagnosis and medical understandings) 
and is palatable for them. 
All professionals should be aware of the impact of diagnosis on self and identity so 
that PRPD are supported to think about the meaning of diagnosis to them. Participants 
feeling like they lost their established sense of self (losing who I am) and rebuilding it 
according to diagnosis was an overwhelmingly negative experience, which could be 
mediated by communicating diagnosis as a name or an explanation for distress and working 
on a richer narrative, rather than diagnosis being something that has to be incorporated into 
sense of self, which is advocated elsewhere (Inder et al., 2008). 
Using Diagnosis and Formulation 
 
This metasynthesis suggests that diagnosis does have purpose for clients (for example 
offering legitimisation and containment); therefore it is important to think about how 
diagnosis can be used with psychological approaches. DCP guidance (BPS, 2014) urges 
services not to insist that PRPD adopt an illness representation of distress, in fact it insists 
that no overarching framework should be adopted. These discourses already exist in mental 
health policy and practice, with recovery-oriented practice in the UK emphasising the 
importance of shared meanings (Shepherd, Boardman & Slade, 2008; Turton et al., 2011). 
Psychological formulation is “a hypothesis about a person’s difficulties, which draws 
from psychological theory” and is co-constructed by a therapist and their client (Johnstone 
& Dallos, 2006, p. 4, original emphasis). In this metasynthesis, some participants felt shame 
about their diagnosis because they had internalised negative societal beliefs (devastation, 
hopelessness and shame) and experienced stigma from others (stigma, non-disclosure and 
isolation). PRPD internalising stigmatising beliefs that the general public hold is 
documented elsewhere (Read & Harré, 2001), which is not surprising given that they are 
part of the general public. Participants also spoke about a lack of information and discussion 




about diagnosis (lack of fit and lack of utility), perhaps reinforcing the idea that diagnosis is 
shameful and so should not be discussed, increasing reliance on already held beliefs. Having 
an understanding of a personal formulation, rather than, or as well as, a label that comes 
with stereotypes, could be a less shaming experience. 
It can be argued that although formulation is not a panacea, it offers the opportunity 
for sense making without a pejorative label. As Pilgrim suggests, “[l]ike diagnoses, 
formulations are fallible, but they are more plausible and more respectful of human 
complexity and the patient’s right to recognition” (2015, p. 7). Qualitative research shows 
that formulation can be a difficult and emotional process for PRPD, with biological 
explanations sometimes preferred because they are validating, socially acceptable and less 
blaming of PRPD and others (Leeming, Boyle & MacDonald 2009). This is in line with 
findings from this metasynthesis about diagnosis offering legitimisation for the reality of 
participants’ distress (legitimisation and containment), as well as access to services for some 
(hope that diagnosis was a means to access services). However it was also linked to stigma 
and hopelessness in the Leeming et al. (2009) study, as it was in the current metasynthesis 
(devastation, hopelessness and stigma). Leeming et al. (2009) suggest working with clients 
to develop resources for explaining their difficulties to others in a way they feel is 
comfortable for them. This could come from formulation, with the explanations developed 
for the individual being shared with others, however other explanations might sit alongside 
formulation. 
Implications for using diagnosis and formulation in practice. Formulation should 
be done in a collaborative, person-specific not problem-specific and collaborative way, 
according to guidance (DCP, 2011). This needs to take account of and explore personal 
meanings attached to distress, including diagnosis and medical models of understanding. 
Perhaps then, to have utility for PRPD, within mental health services and societal 




discourses, formulation has to move beyond the individual, to allow real biopsychosocial 
meanings to be shared, away from what Pilgrim describes as “psychological reductionism” 
(2014, p. 297). If diagnosis offers legitimisation and containment, those positive outcomes 
need to be preserved and perhaps heightened by offering explanation about the relevance of 
diagnosis to that person, not simply dismissing it outright. 
As Pilgrim suggested, “there are good reasons to move towards a clearer position 
regarding the roles of diagnosis and formulation” (2010, p. 449). The DCP position 
statement (BPS, 2013) goes some way towards this. Perhaps guidance is needed about how 
to implement alternative approaches in a diagnostically driven environment. Developing 
shared meanings with PRPD about their difficulties is indicated here, which would include 
open discussions about diagnosis and how it might or might not fit for that individual (as 
indicated in the lack of fit and lack of utility subtheme). Developing truly collaborative 
understandings of distress would be in line with health policy in England that strives for 
PRPD and professionals working in partnership (Department of Health, 2006). 
Limitations 
 
It must be noted that the studies were conducted internationally and therefore in a 
range of cultures, policy and healthcare systems, which may influence the results. However, 
despite these diverse circumstances, there was greater similarity than difference in 
participants’ experiences of diagnosis. 
Separating out the experience and impact of diagnosis and the experience and impact 
of distress is not a simple task. For example, in subthemes losing who I am and rebuilding 
self, it is difficult to know how much of those processes are about diagnosis and how much 
are about the underlying distress, which is perhaps difficult for participants and researchers 
to disentangle. However, with the personal experience theme, participants seemed clear that 
the trigger to these issues with self was the point of diagnosis, even though they had often 




been living with their distress for years. The complexity and interconnectedness of these 
experiences should be noted. 
The CASP (PHRU, 2006) scores (Table 3) indicated that reporting quality of many of 
the studies could be improved. It is important to note that the contribution that each study is 
able to make to a metasynthesis depends on reporting quality, particularly in terms of how 
findings are reported. Findings of the studies of greater quality and those that provided more 
detail and insight into participants’ experience of diagnosis (e.g. Horn et al., 2007) are 
reflected within the findings of this metasynthesis more than articles of poorer reporting 
quality and that explored other experiences in addition to diagnosis (e.g. Inder et al., 2010).  
Future Research 
The decision not to include findings about diagnosis in qualitative research that 
explored other aspects of living with distress was justified in the methodology section. 
However, some valuable insights into the experience of diagnosis, which are included in that 
literature base, may have been missed. This could make an interesting topic for a further 
metasynthesis. 
Given that this metasynthesis found participants to have had similar experiences 
across diagnoses, it is interesting that a lot of research chooses to sample participants based 
on diagnosis, for example Inder et al. (2008) studied the impact of a diagnosis of bipolar 
disorder on the development of self, as discussed previously. This metasynthesis has found 
that the impact of diagnosis on self is similar across diagnoses, which suggests that Inder et 
al.’s (2008) findings could also be relevant for other PRPD who have not been diagnosed in 
the same way. Researchers perhaps need to grapple with these issues in order to maximise 
the utility of their findings. 






This metasynthesis has explored the experience of being diagnosed with a mental 
health problem and has shown that diagnosis is a largely problematic phenomenon but it 
does have value for PRPD. There are other approaches to enabling PRPD to understand 
their distress and difficulties, particularly narrative approaches and psychological 
formulation. Diagnosis can helpfully form part of those approaches, which are not 
unproblematic themselves. Because diagnosis remains an influential framework for 
understanding distress, suggestions have been made about using diagnosis more 
constructively, perhaps minimising some of its negative effects. It seems there is a need to 
engage with the complexity of human experience (sometimes labeled as distress, mental 
health or illness) but also with the complexity of the impact of our existing frameworks for 
understanding distress. This may involve diverting attention and resources from the 
formulation versus diagnosis debate, towards achieving a better understanding of the 
underpinning ideas in both these constructs that support people to understand distress. 
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after they have received a 
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Email interviews with expert 
patients; Phenomenology and 
Lived Experience framework 
New Zealand; all diagnoses; 
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38 women; age range 26-68; 
 
43 European/Pakeha; 11 
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through Black Dog Institute 
website, community mental 
health organisations, media, 
GPs and psychiatrists 
(diagnosed in last 12 months; 
age 18+; currently accessing 
services; scored 22+ on the 
Mood Swings 
Questionnaire). 
    
    
Pitt et al. (2009) Explore the impact of a 
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Background: There is debate surrounding the use of psychiatric diagnosis in mental health 
practice, however little is known about how it is used by practitioners and why its use is 
sustained, when concerns about its validity and impact on those it labels are well 
documented. 
Aims: To develop a grounded theory (GT) that explains how diagnosis is used in adult 
mental health practice in the National Health Service in England. 
Method: GT methodology was used, interviewing ten participants from complex care and 
treatment teams. 
Results: The core category needing a certain foundation for practice was constructed from the 
data, with two further categories; holding and coping with inconsistent and differing views and 
impact on practice: depersonalisation and not challenging diagnosis. Findings are discussed in 
relation to previous research, and to attachment and cognitive theories. 
Conclusions: Results suggest diagnosis has survived because it provides, for some, a secure 
base for practice. For others, the power dynamics inherent in working in a system predicated 
on diagnosis and the perceived lack of utility of diagnosis, make challenging it unappealing. 
Suggestions are made to encourage critical consideration of all frameworks used to 
understand distress. 




Keywords: Grounded theory, staff, diagnosis. 




Debates about the validity, reliability and utility of classifying distress according to 
psychiatric diagnosis (herein referred to as diagnosis) have raged since the 19th century 
(Johnstone, 2014). There are two diagnostic classification systems, the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD), now in its tenth edition (World Health Organization, 1992) 
and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), now in its fifth 
edition (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). Concerns about reliability are 
empirically supported by research demonstrating that psychiatrists frequently disagree about 
the most accurate diagnosis (e.g. Bentall, 2003, 2009). Comorbidity studies show people who 
meet the criteria for one diagnosis most likely meet the criteria for at least one other (e.g. 
Boyle, 2002; Timimi, 2011a), raising concerns about validity. 
 
The stigma attached to diagnosis has also been found to have a negative impact on 
 
those it labels (Ben-Zeev, Young & Corrigan, 2010). As justified in section one of this thesis, 
 
in an attempt to use language that does not make assumptions about inner experiences, the 
 
term ‘people in receipt of a psychiatric diagnosis’ (PRPD) will be used to refer to those who 
 
have been labeled using diagnosis. 
 
This debate has heightened and become more public in recent years, due to the 
publication of the updated DSM-5 (APA, 2013). Some believe that the diagnostic system is 
inherently flawed (“unreliable and invalid”) because categorising distress in this way implies 
biological causation, which is not evidenced (The Midlands Psychology Group, 2012, p.7). 
The Critical Psychiatry Network in the UK have suggested, in academic literature, that 
psychiatry should move away from biological reductionism towards openness to different 
systems of meaning (e.g. Bracken et al., 2012). 
Fairly new to the debate, in 2013, the British Psychological Society’s (BPS) Division 
of Clinical Psychology (DCP) released a position statement, in response to the publication of 
DSM-V, calling for a “paradigm shift” away from a diagnostic, medical understanding of 




distress (BPS, 2013). It suggested that less stigmatising frameworks are needed for a richer 
understanding of distress as human experience. 
As discussed in the literature review of this thesis, qualitative research with people 
who have been diagnosed reveals mixed views and experiences. For some, diagnosis offers a 
validating explanation for their distress and a treatment pathway (Leeming, Boyle & 
MacDonald, 2009). Diagnosis has also been described as legitimising the problems 
experienced by PRPD as medical, real and not their fault (Pitt, Kilbride, Welford, Nothard & 
Morrison, 2009). Other PRPD experience it as hopeless when it is delivered without hope for 
recovery and its potential personal relevance is not explored (Horn, Johnstone & Brooke, 
2007). It has also been suggested that the perceived benefits of diagnosis are compromised by 
its lack of validity and reliability (The Midlands Psychology Group, 2012). Therefore, 
diagnosis has been shown to have utility for PRPD, but this is potentially compromised by its 
questionable validity, reliability and the way it is communicated. Perhaps then, a better 
understanding of how diagnostic and other frameworks of understanding are used in practice 
is needed. 
 
Existing Research: Practitioners and Diagnosis 
 
There is a small body of research exploring mental health practitioners’ views on and 
use of diagnosis in practice. Probst (2012) qualitatively explored how social workers (SWs) 
in the USA navigate using diagnosis in practice, finding that SWs walked a metaphorical 
tightrope needing to exaggerate problems, or fit them into overlapping, ill-fitting categories, 
to hastily access services and insurance on behalf of PRPD. However they also felt a pull to 
minimise pathologising what they saw as problems of living, so as not to compromise their 
ethical values. Diagnosis compromising esteemed professional values was echoed by nurses 
in New Zealand in a questionnaire study (Aitchison & Mellsop, 2010); they used diagnosis to 
inform treatment plans, communicate difficulties to PRPD and their families and for 




admission and discharge thresholds, but believed diagnosis squeezed out alternative 
explanations of difficulties and hindered recovery. In the UK, Stalker, Ferguson and Barclay 
(2005) explored practitioner views about personality disorder diagnosis. Their participants 
felt that diagnosis provided access to some services and a common language for 
understanding distress but were concerned about stigma. 
A larger scale study with psychologists in 23 countries (Evans et al., 2013) showed 
that 60% used a formal classification system (ICD-10 or DSM-IV) in practice to inform 
treatment decisions and support communication with PRPD and other professionals, but most 
used systems as flexible guidelines rather than strict criteria. A further large-scale 
questionnaire study with psychiatrists in Brazil, Japan and New Zealand (Mellsop et al., 
2007), suggested most believed diagnostic systems were important for communication with 
other professionals but some felt diagnosis had limited utility in informing treatment plans, 
those in Japan and New Zealand questioned cross cultural applicability and most wanted a 
simpler and more reliable system. 
Therefore, existing research suggests there are sections within all clinical groups 
working with PRPD that are critical of diagnosis, however they continue to use diagnostic 
systems to communicate and describe the needs of PRPD. As there are for PRPD living with 
diagnosis, for staff too there are positive and negative aspects to this paradigm. 
Psychology in Mental Health Settings 
 
Formulation in psychology has been considered by some to offer a more 
individualised approach to care in contrast to the standardised approaches that can result from 
diagnostic categories (Aston, 2009). Psychological formulation has been defined as “a 
hypothesis about a person’s difficulties, which draws from psychological theory” (Johnstone 
& Dallos, 2006, p. 4, original emphasis). Formulation developed, arguably, in behaviourism 
in the 1950s in the USA, as functional analysis, which developed into case formulation, as an 




attempt to establish credibility in relation to psychiatry on the basis that it offered a clearer 
pathway to intervention and did not rely on the unobservable mind (it relied on observable 
behaviour), like diagnosis did (Eells, 1997). Approaches to formulation based on other 
psychological models have been developed since and debate about the respective uses of 
formulation and diagnosis has grown (Johnstone, 2006). As Pilgrim and Carey (2010) have 
suggested, the divergence of clinical psychology (CP) away from diagnosis and towards 
formulation became “a rallying point for a distinctive professional identity” (p. 312) and 
some psychologists argue that formulation and diagnosis are fundamentally incompatible 
because of the link between diagnosis and biological causation of distress (Vanheule, 2012). 
It could be argued that there are advantages for CPs in discrediting diagnosis and 
 
encouraging the use of formulation as the preferred alternative, galvanising their own 
 
professional identity and utility, as distinct from other mental health professionals. 
 
In the UK, formulation is a core competency for CPs (DCP, 2010). Formulation is 
also a core competency for CPs in Australia (Page, Werner, Stritzke & McLean, 2008), and 
psychologists in the USA, who are expected to formulate and diagnose (American 
Psychological Association, 2006). Formulation is not only the domain of CPs in the UK; it is 
a competency of practitioner psychologists (Health and Care Professions Council [HCPC], 
2012). The DCP (2011) and the HCPC (2012) encourage formulation to be done with teams 
(constructing shared understandings of difficulties), and training and supervision of other 
professionals to support them to formulate. The Department of Health (DH) too advises 
working from shared formulation to guide care in teams (DH, 1999). 
Research about formulation in teams is limited (Johnstone & Dallos, 2006). One 
qualitative study found that staff working with adults on an inpatient recovery unit believed 
team formulation aided understanding of the individuals they were working with and their 
distress but also found differences in participants’ views, with some seeing formulation as 




‘fact’, leading to treatment pathways and others seeing it as offering provisional hypotheses 
to be reflected on (Summers, 2006). Dexter-Smith (2010) found that team formulation helped 
emotional containment of staff working in stressful jobs. 
Rationale for Current Study 
 
As Pilgrim (2014) suggests, it would be useful to move away from considering what 
is wrong with diagnosis towards considering why alternatives to it have not had a similar 
impact. If, as the DCP (BPS, 2013) suggest, a new framework is needed for practice, an 
understanding is needed about why diagnosis has survived for so long, with widespread 
concern about its validity and impact on PRPD, because this has not been explained by 
existing research. Mellsop et al. (2007) suggested it was important to “carry out research on 
the way [diagnostic] systems actually shape and inform clinical care” with all types of 
practitioner (p. 25). Developing a theory of how diagnosis is used in practice could contribute 
to an understanding of the processes behind its survival as a dominant paradigm. The aim of 
the current study thus was to develop a grounded theory to explain how diagnosis is used in 





A grounded theory (GT) methodology was used (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), drawing 
on techniques from Charmaz (2006), adopting a social constructivist epistemology, where it 
is acknowledged that all those involved in research (including the researcher) co-construct 
the realities under study (Pidgeon & Henwood, 1997). GT was considered appropriate to 
answer the research question because developing a theoretical model of practice, grounded in 
data, was the primary interest and because it was anticipated that there would be little 
homogeneity in responses of participants. Traditional GT is defined by its creators as “the 
discovery of theory from data systematically obtained from social research” (Glaser & 




Strauss, 1967, p. 2), originally developed in a positivist paradigm to bridge the gap between 
quantitative and qualitative research. The development of GT has been considered a 
“methodological spiral” (Mills, Bonner, & Francis, 2006, p. 2), with many approaches 
proposed. 
Charmaz’s (2006) methods were used in this study for a number of reasons. As 
elaborated on in the critical appraisal of this thesis, the time and resource constraints of the 
thesis required some modifications to the GT method, therefore Charmaz’s provision of 
“flexible guidelines” (2006, p. 16) was vital. GT lends itself to developing an understanding 
of how diagnosis is used because it seeks to explain (in this case how diagnosis is used in 
practice) rather than describe and explore (Birks & Mills, 2011). 
This study did not differentiate between diagnoses, for example as Stalker et al. 
(2003) did when exploring attitudes towards ‘personality disorder’. It was felt that this 
maintained focus on the use of diagnosis as a general construct and avoided the use of 
heavily contested diagnostic categories; as Church (2013) suggests, “our studies remain 
encased in the diagnostic categories” we criticise (p. 29). 
Research Approvals 
 
The research was approved by Lancaster University Research Ethics Committee (see 
ethics section for approval letter [p. 4-29] and other documents) and the trust’s Research and 
Development (R&D) Department (see ethics section for approval letter [p. 4-30]). 
Participants 
 
Participants were recruited from the nine adult mental health complex care and 
 
treatment teams (CCTTs) in one NHS trust. The aim of the sampling method was to recruit 
 
participants who would have experience using psychiatric diagnosis in their work. In 
 
accordance with a purposive sampling method, participants were recruited according to their 
 
job role, which was care coordinator (CC), to ensure that they would be able to provide data 




relevant to the research question; they would have experience using psychiatric diagnosis in 
 
practice. All participants were qualified social workers or mental health nurses, practising in 
 
the CC role, responsible for the care of a caseload of adults who had been labeled as having 
 
‘severe and enduring mental health problems’ and varying psychiatric diagnoses. 
 
Theoretical sampling is considered by some to be a distinctive feature of GT (Glaser 
 
& Strauss, 1967). According to Charmaz, theoretical sampling is seeking “people, events, or 
information to illuminate and define the boundaries and relevance of the categories” but it is 
not an essential component of GT research (2006, p. 189). Here, theoretical sampling of 
participants was not possible due to the small number of participants and demographic data 
not being collected (in an attempt to preserve anonymity). 
Following ethical approval, 10 participants in total volunteered to participate and all 
were subsequently interviewed. The recruitment strategy, as laid out in Figure 1, was 
followed. The intention was to interview a representative sample of participants from all nine 
teams. However, due to only 10 participants expressing an interest, all were interviewed, 
representing only 7 teams. The methodological implications of recruitment and sampling are 
elaborated on in the discussion section and in the critical appraisal. 




Interviews were conducted at participants’ places of work. The participant and 
interviewer both signed the consent form (see ethics section, p. 4-26) before each interview. 
Each interview was transcribed and analysed before the next was conducted and interviews 
were done in blocks (three in the initial block, four in the subsequent block and three in the 
final block) to allow time in between blocks for theory development (see Figure 2 for data 
collection and analysis diagram). Interviews were completed between September 2014 and 
January 2015. An interview schedule that would capture information relevant to the research 




question was developed with supervisors and was subsequently altered to test out the 
emerging categories (Charmaz, 2006). 




Data was analysed using GT methods (see Figure 2), drawing on techniques from 
Charmaz (2006). Consulting the literature on the research topic before conducting a GT study 
is a controversial topic, with Glaser and Strauss originally advocating not consulting the 
literature to avoid imposing its ideas onto data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). However, some 
grounded theorists suggest that it is unrealistic to expect researchers will not be familiar with 
research and theory in their area (Pidgeon & Henwood, 1997). 
This issue was approached by conducting a brief, preliminary literature review, to 
offer a theoretical rationale for the research, as was a requirement of the ethics protocol (see 
ethics section, p. 4-2). However, consulting the literature about practitioner perspectives on 
diagnosis in depth was suspended until data analysis was complete (Dey, 1999). It was hoped 
 
that this approach, as well as using memos to make clear any links to extant theoretical ideas, 
 
literature or research, avoided as much as is practicable, imposing those ideas onto the data. 
 
As Charmaz (2006) advises, these extant ideas were also considered critically and treated as 
 
problematic, not as given truths which data should be constructed around. 
 
Grounded theory as an approach has been criticised for failing to acknowledge 
 
implicit theories that guide theory development (Silverman, 2005). Therefore, links made to 
 
existing theory, impressions, interpretations and connections between interviews were 
 
monitored using memos (see example in Appendix 2-B). Memos took the form of diagrams 
 
or written prose, which supported the analytic grasp of the data, noting comparisons between 
 
codes and initial theoretical ideas. These memos were kept in chronological order initially but 
 
were then sorted according to which focused code they explicated or theoretical link they 




elaborated on and these were constantly compared to and fed back into the resulting 
 
grounded GT. A reflective diary was also used when necessary to record the researcher’s 
 
reactions to the research process, the interviews and the data gathered, which helped when 
 




Two levels of coding, advocated by Charmaz (2006), were completed during data 
analysis, which was done following the transcription of each interview. An example of both 
levels of coding is given in Appendix 2-C. Initial coding was the first coding stage, which 
involved line by line coding, focusing tightly on the actual data rather than the preconceived 
ideas of the researcher (Charmaz, 2006). These codes were specific and active (using 
gerunds), to enable identification of processes in the data (Charmaz, 2006). 
Following this, focused coding was completed, which subsumed initial codes to 
explain segments of the data and to “advance the theoretical direction” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 
138) of the coding. Focused coding allowed comparison between initial codes to determine 
their power to explain certain phenomena within the data and also to determine the codes or 
groups of codes that were initial categories (had explanatory power for phenomena noticed in 
the data). Focused codes were raised to categories where analytic links were made and the 
properties of the category were defined, as well as the conditions it operated within and its 
relationship to other categories. This was done by representing focused codes, with their 
initial codes and an example data extract on Post-Its and grouping them, using flip chart 
paper, into categories. Examples of coding and category development are given in Appendix 
2-D. The theory was built throughout this process, creating links between categories to form 
the GT (shown in Figure 3). 
FIGURE 3 HERE 




A constant comparison method was used, where data collection, coding and memo 
writing were alternated and new findings accommodated into the existing theory (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). This method allows for comparisons at all levels, comparing codes within and 
 
between interviews, going on to compare categories with codes, comparing categories and 
 
codes with and using memos (which compare links with existing theory to data), going back 
 
over transcripts to recode where necessary, when new focused codes had emerged in later 
 
transcripts. Again this supported a social constructivist approach, treating analysis at all 
 
levels as one understanding of the data, constantly comparing it with new and existing data, 
 
codes and categories, altering it to reflect the evident actions and processes. For example, as 
discussed in the series of memos in Appendix 2-B, attachment theory emerged early on as a 
potential way to understand some aspects of the use of diagnosis. This was recognised as a 
link to existing theory, so was considered using memos, in an attempt to set it aside and allow 
a fresh perspective on the data. However, making that link explicit through memo writing 
allowed further questioning about the idea of having a foundation from which to practise and 
the issue of challenging that foundation. 
Findings 
 
This section presents the findings of the study and should be read alongside the GT 
diagram (Figure 3). Participant quotations are provided, identifying participants by number 
(e.g. participant one is represented by the identifier P1). A summary of the GT is given, 
followed by explanation of the categories. 
Summary of the Grounded Theory: How Practitioners Use Diagnosis in Practice 
 
Participants felt the pressure of their jobs, mostly due to excessive workloads and 
working with risk (P1 explained their work as “really really risky”). That pressure caused 
anxiety and uncertainty, setting in motion the core category (needing a certain foundation for 
practice). A core category is a category that relates to other categories and has strong 




explanatory power (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), here explaining overall why and how 
practitioners used diagnosis; needing a certain foundation for practice drove participants to 
choose a foundation for their work to reduce uncertainty. There were three strands, which 
divided participants according to what they used as their certain foundation. In the first strand 
(S1), participants used diagnosis, in the second (S2) participants were wary of diagnosis and 
relied on their team and their own experience and in the third (S3) participants rejected 
diagnosis and relied on a psychological model they had been trained in. 
These strands operated within the other categories (holding and coping with 
inconsistent and differing views and impact on practice; depersonalisation and not 
challenging diagnosis) in different ways, explaining how diagnosis affected practice. All 
participants, regardless of their preferred strand, held inconsistent views about diagnosis, 
particularly its validity. Participants in the different strands had different ways of coping with 
those views. In S1, those views were ignored and diagnosis revered. In S2 there was some 
engagement with inconsistent views but they were mostly ignored. Those in S3 purported to 
fully recognise their inconsistent views and used the poor validity of diagnosis to bolster 
confidence in their own model. Differing views about diagnosis in teams seemed to be 
ignored by all, with no space to reflect on those issues. Also, those in S1 did not discuss 
issues around diagnosis because they ignored them, those in S2 did not discuss them because 
they did not want to challenge the team they relied on for their certain foundation and those 
in S3 did not debate diagnosis in their teams because they avoided engaging with others with 
differing opinions. 
Further consequences for practice, resulting from participants’ choice of secure 
 
foundation, were depersonalisation and not challenging diagnosis. Those in S1 used 
diagnosis to depersonalise PRPD, allowing emotional distancing when difficult decisions 
were made under pressure. They did not challenge diagnosis because they believed it to be a 




useful and valid framework. Those in S2 also depersonalised PRPD but would advocate on 
 
diagnostic issues, for example challenging a diagnosis, when this was initiated by the 
 
individual. Otherwise they were apathetic about challenging diagnosis, not wanting to 
challenge the team they relied on for certainty and feeling powerless to affect change. Those 
in S3 were indifferent to diagnosis because they did not see it as important in practice, so 
they tended to ignore diagnostic issues. Therefore, all strands, regardless of their views about 
diagnosis or how they used it in practice, did not challenge diagnosis. 
Participants broadly fell into one of the three strands but could switch strands. For 
example when risk was high, participants in S2 reported at times relying on diagnosis to 
justify decision making. For some this seemed like a necessary relinquishing of responsibility 
 
to a medical model, which they believed offered some certainty. Participants in S1 talked 
about using their teams for support but only when that team was supportive. However, using 
psychological models was exclusive to participants in the third strand who had been trained 
in those models; those in strands one and two could not access that practice foundation. 
Those in S3 reported sticking to their model for decision making. Even in high risk situations 
 
they did not revert to using diagnosis; a paradigm they felt was lacking validity. Below, 
categories are further explained and illuminated with quotations. 
Core Category: Needing a Certain Foundation for Practice 
 
This category explains how, because of the pressure of their jobs creating uncertainty, 
all participants were driven to find a foundation for practice they felt reduced uncertainty. 
This foundation consisted of an evidence base and, for some, a clear treatment pathway that 
provided some certainty in the rationale for their decisions. This foundation was either 
accessed through diagnosis (for participants in strands one and sometimes those in S2), their 
team (for those in S2 and sometimes those in S1) or psychological models (for those in S3). 




Working with risk seemed to drive this need for a secure foundation because it was “anxiety- 
provoking” (P7). 
Participants in all strands spoke about needing to make “defendable” (P9) decisions, 
what P10 called “that cover your arse need”. The need for a certain foundation was linked to 
making decisions that could be defended if something went wrong; “I need to make sure that 
I’ve covered all bases as well for the benefit of the service user, not just, erm, you know for 
myself (laughs) and my career and stuff” (P2). 
For those in S1 diagnosis offered certainty in a treatment pathway to follow; “there’s 
a pathway in terms of care that is led by the diagnostic part of that” (P5), and so deciding on 
this pathway from diagnosis was “relatively straightforward” (P8). The certainty that 
diagnosis offered for some was reflected in the certain language they used to describe it; for 
example P5 used the term “rubber stamped” a number of times. 
Participants in S2 talked about using their team to clearly define the rationale for 
decisions (e.g. P7 discussed “using knowledge within the team, especially around care 
planning”). They also used diagnosis to access an evidence base, which provided a rationale 
for decisions; 
We do work from an evidence base, so, you know, if someone does have a diagnosis 
of personality disorder, you work from an evidence based practice. Such as, erm, 72 
hour beds […] because otherwise, if you just had a caseload of people with severe and 
enduring mental health and that wasn’t categorised, how would you, kind of, 
intervene for someone with bipolar. Because, they may need- they wouldn’t respond 
to 72 hours in hospital. Whereas the evidence base for people with personality 
disorder, there’s lots of evidence to suggest that short, sharp periods of inpatient 
treatment is more beneficial. So the diagnoses do lead to evidence based practice. (P1) 




There was a tension that was not explicated or perhaps realised by any participant in S1 and 
S2; they rely on an evidence base, which is differentiated in terms of diagnosis, however (as 
discussed below) some do not feel that diagnoses truly represent the difficulties of the PRPD 
they work with and express inconsistent views about its validity. P1, despite relying on 
diagnosis to access evidence base, previously expressed strong views that diagnosis should be 
seen as “just how you describe it” and that description is not robust or reliable; 
Diagnosis can be based on that very simplistic, you know, how many boxes have we 
ticked? You’ve ticked 3 boxes in bipolar, you’ve ticked 2 boxes in schizophrenia and 
a box in depression and anxiety so… we’ll go with the bipolar. 
The difficulties with using an evidence base determined by diagnosis are recognised 
and articulated more fully by those in S3, who use formulation to find certainty about and a 
rationale for their decision making; “ [I use] formulation because it helps to provide a 
rationale for what we’re doing and it helps people feel more competent and comfortable” 
(P6). For these participants, pathways being based on diagnosis caused confusion; “We have 
clear pathways about what we’re doing with borderline personality clients, what we’re doing 
with our psychosis clients, quite often they have a mixture of both presentations (laughs), so 
it’s like which one are we following?!” (P4). P6 succinctly suggested that they preferred 
“having a strong rationale for the person as opposed to having a strong rationale for the 
diagnosis” and discussed the same issue of the 72 hour admission, as discussed by P1 above; 
“So, this person might present in this way and we’ve learnt from history […] that a maximum 
of 72 hours is important because X, Y and Z as opposed to ‘we know that all people with 
BPD should have’.” Therefore participants in S3 rely on their models to access an evidence 
base predicated on diagnosis in a more individualised way, taking into account the needs and 
histories of individual PRPD. 




Holding and Coping with Inconsistent and Differing Views 
 
This category captures the inconsistent views about the validity of the diagnostic 
paradigm and causation of distress expressed by all participants. How participants coped with 
this inconsistency and differing opinions was influenced by needing a certain foundation for 
practice. 
Inconsistent views. Those in S1 who relied on diagnosis recognised the issues with 
validity (“they might have had several different diagnoses” [P2]), but seemingly ignored 
them or pushed them aside; believing in “right” and “wrong” (P2) or “true diagnoses” (P5), 
showing a quest for certainty in “a definitive diagnosis” (P3). Working with a PRPD with the 
“wrong” diagnosis was difficult because they would be on the “wrong” treatment pathway 
(P2). There was a sense of responsibility here; “it’s about making sure that you get it right. 
Because they have to go on and live their lives appropriately, you know, with the right 
treatment” (P3) and perhaps having a sense of certainty about getting it right alleviated some 
of the anxiety about responsibility. 
Therefore, participants in S1 were aware of debates around the validity of diagnostic 
categories but did not allow themselves to challenge their paradigm, perhaps because it is the 
thing that offers certainty. P5 believed that research and education had improved accuracy in 
diagnosis; “Historically people have been misdiagnosed and as more education and research 
has developed about diagnoses then, you know, perhaps 10-15 years ago they wouldn’t have 
been diagnosed as they would now and may have been given a different one”. Here, P5 is 
suggesting that the same presentation being labelled differently as time goes on is due to the 
accuracy of labelling improving. Participants in S1 were aware of potential issues of validity 
but had developed a way to cope with these inconsistent views, being selective in the 
evidence they chose to accept, their interpretations of such evidence and the degree to which 
they engaged in the debates. 




Many participants in the second and third strands expressed and justified views that 
could be broadly identified as social constructionist, that diagnosis is a product of time and 
culture (“It’s so subjective” [P4]): 
The Virgin Mary would have been detained on a treatment order if she’d have lived 
now. With those sorts of beliefs she would have been diagnosed with schizophrenia 
[…] If we had someone walk in here today and say they were gonna give birth to a 
baby but they’d never actually… had … sex… (laughs)… we’d be going “delusional! 
Needs treatment!”. (P1) 
However those in S2 did not dismiss the validity of diagnosis outright and still held onto 
some beliefs about biological causation, for example P10 discussed psychological and genetic 
causation for some presentations of distress; “we can’t even find a biological basis for      
most things” (emphasis added). Participants in S2 seemed unaware of their inconsistent views 
but most insisted on the importance of being “reflective” (P9), which ensured “you don’t just 
accept unquestioningly everything that’s done”; P10 understood this reflectiveness as having 
“a questioning nature”. However, P9 also reflected that time pressures meant reflection was 
not part of routine practice, perhaps explaining why this reflection only went so far. 
Participants in S3 expressed that they never felt “confident” (P4) that diagnosis was a 
valid description of an individual’s presentation. However there was still a sense of 
inconsistency, for example P6 discussed their view that the only thing diagnosis indicates is 
“other people’s perceptions” but later concedes it is “a tool not the tool”, which is useful for 
research and prescribing, and used a job title that included a diagnostic term. This suggests 
that there is a belief in the lack of validity of diagnosis, with P6 presenting themselves as 
rejecting diagnosis, but that it still has some utility for them in practice. P6 blamed this on the 
“gap between psychological formulation and the medical model”, which made it impossible 
to fully reject diagnosis and meant that it was still useful in some areas, as discussed. 




Differing views. Despite differing views being expressed by those in the different 
strands and P9 describing an “ideological battle” between diagnostic and other frameworks, 
most insisted that this was not an issue in practice. However, this seemed to be because there 
was “no real forum to have a debate” (P8) due to the time pressures of the job, which had 
resulted in a process of “streamlining” where treatment based within a diagnostic evidence 
base was advocated with little discussion (P10). Debate seemed pointless anyway because a 
psychiatrist always “calls the diagnosis” (P2). Despite a lack of more formal debate, 
disagreement around diagnosis happened informally and there was an awareness of others’ 
views on diagnosis; “I know that some people would disagree with me, some of my 
colleagues are really against, erm, diagnosis (laughs), some of the banter we have!” (P2). 
For those in S2, having diagnostic debates was not well received, with P1 having 
been branded “awkward” by psychiatry colleagues and seemingly developing a thick skin to 
tolerate that; “I have been called the second most awkward AMHP [approved mental health 
professional] one doctor has ever known (laughing). I went ‘that’s a shame why can’t I get 
top spot’ (laughing)” (P1). However, for some working every day in a system that was not in 
line with their views was clearly difficult and frustrating. P9 spoke about their frustration 
with diagnostic streamlining of the service; 
[It’s] almost like dehumanising people. It’s ‘well it’s a bipolar person and this is what 
they get, that’s what happens, they’ll get 18 months and should be on their way’. You 
know we’re not dealing with tins of peas we’re dealing with people and I think the 
service is in massive danger of losing sight of that, if it hasn’t already. Which I 
suspect it has. 
There was a sense, particularly for those in S2 but also in S1 that they did not want to 
upset the team with too much disagreement. For those in S1, this seemed to be about not 
wanting to disregard hierarchies (“there’s still a hierarchy at the end of the day so I’m happy 




to be overruled”, P2). For those in S2 it seemed to be more about not damaging the 
relationships relied on to offer their secure foundation (P9 expressed views that suggested 
criticism of the validity of the diagnoses made by the team’s psychiatrist but then insisted “I 
wouldn’t go as far as to say that I’m questioning validity” [P9]). 
Those in the third strand were more explicit about how they coped with those views, 
describing “holding” those views in mind (P6) and using supervision to flesh them out and 
gain support in trying to use psychological ideas in a medically dominated system. They were 
clear about how their views differed from their colleagues’, for example P6 was aware that 
their views about diagnosis and the way they used it in practice were “different to how kind 
of, how the medical model works” and this sometimes caused conflict with others. However, 
there was a more subtle sense of burrowing down, ignoring those with other views. For 
example, when discussing the utility of diagnosis, P6 said, “that is [psychiatry’s] role and 
from my perspective we hear that, we hold that in mind and we get on with our jobs at the 
same time”. This also came through, although not as strongly, for participants in S2; there 
was a sense that they gravitated towards colleagues who had similar views to them (“I mean I 
guess you have your own individual sphere of influence” [P9]). 
The Impact on Practice: Depersonalisation and Not Challenging Diagnosis 
 
This category explains the differing ways in which participants’ use of diagnosis 
impacted on their practice, in particular considering how needing a certain foundation for 
practice in some instances resulted in depersonalising PRPD and not challenging the 
diagnostic paradigm. 
Depersonalising PRPD. The depersonalisation of PRPD came across in the way 
some participants in S1 and S2 spoke about them; for example grouping PRPD with similar 
diagnoses together, describing people as ‘disorders’; “I have a few emotionally unstable 
personality disorders on my caseload” [P7]). For those in strands one and two, this 




depersonalisation enabled difficult decisions to be made, for example about discharging 
someone who had not recovered, with emotional distance. In that instance, diagnosis and 
treatment pathways can be used as evidence that the person has not improved despite 
evidence based treatment being offered (“it makes it less personal to that person that it is a 
process we need to follow” [P2]). As P4, who was predominantly in S3, articulates when 
criticising this approach; diagnosis almost gives an excuse for difficult, unethical decisions, 
“and if they don’t engage in that then they’re discharged, let’s not worry about them and just 
say we’ve offered what we were meant to offer […] job done.” 
Taking diagnosis seriously and advocating. Across the strands, participants spoke 
about the value of diagnosis for PRPD, many of whom wanted a diagnosis for validation 
(“people need it in black and white, why they are like they are” [P1]) and proof of their 
difficulties (“if you’re supporting people with their economic wellbeing, to claim benefits. 
The first question you get is ‘what is your diagnosis?’” [P1]). It can also lead to access to 
services (“it can open up avenues” [P6]), which makes throwing “a name in a hat” powerful 
(P3). 
Due to the power carried with diagnosis, those in S2 saw themselves as advocates for 
PRPD who felt they needed a diagnosis or a change in diagnosis. They would support 
individuals in accessing a second opinion, however there was a sense that this was a pointless 
process because “once a diagnosis is given, it’s hard to change” (P2). Participants in S2 
reported only doing this if the PRPD asked directly for a second opinion, perhaps because 
this activated their own views about the diagnostic system and its poor validity. However, P7 
recognised how power may play a part in PRPD questioning or discussing their diagnosis 
“the power imbalance, you know, doctors are up here (points up) and service users feel much 
lower down. So to disagree with a doctor? I don’t think you get that a lot.” It seemed 
participants too were sometimes subject to that power imbalance: P8 said; 




I’ve certainly known consultants to be quite defensive about any challenges, you 
know questioning of diagnosis because they see it as their domain to make that and 
it’s kind of, ‘what qualification do you have to’, you know, whereas I don’t think you 
need any qualifications to be able to ask a question. 
For those in the first strand, a lack of agreement with diagnosis on the part of a PRPD 
was seen as lack of insight into their difficulties. P5 said that, in response to PRPD 
questioning diagnosis they would “remain professional and explain why that decision’s been 
made”. One consequence of not challenging diagnosis was that participants in S1 and S2 
supported PRPD to look at diagnostic criteria and try to understand how they applied to them; 
“it’s about people discovering what bipolar or whatever means for them” (P2), exploring the 
potential personal relevance of diagnosis. 
However, participants in S3 discussed not challenging because they “ignore” 
diagnosis (P4) in practice. P6 said “I wonder if I’m sometimes not too driven to challenge a 
diagnosis just because I don’t put so much emphasis on diagnosis anyway that it kind of 
doesn’t matter so much (laughs)”. Challenge again felt pointless in the current system; “I 
think the difficulty is that it’s just so subjective that people can have half a dozen different 
diagnoses on the system and each psychiatrist will say they’re right (laughs). (P4)” 
Discussion 
 
These findings suggest that, regardless of views about diagnosis, all strands lead to 
not questioning diagnosis, either due to relying on it for security and certainty in practice, not 
wanting to threaten the team which provides certainty, or not respecting the framework and 
therefore not engaging with issues around its validity. This GT explains why diagnosis 
remains a dominant framework in this adult community mental health setting; theoretical 
links are made here to explicate this further. Implications for clinical practice in psychology 
and mental health are explored. 




Links to Existing Theory 
 
Cognitive theories. It seems that all participants experienced cognitive dissonance, 
which is discomfort that occurs in situations where attitudes, beliefs or behaviours conflict, 
driving efforts to alleviate discomfort by altering those attitudes, beliefs or behaviours 
(Festinger, 1957). Participants were trying to work in a system dominated by diagnosis, some 
relying on it as the foundation of their work, in the face of information which cast doubt on 
its validity and utility, causing dissonance. Those in different strands dealt with this 
differently, in ways consistent with those conceptualised by Festinger (1957). In S1, 
participants ignored information that caused dissonance and tried to acquire new information 
to outweigh dissonant beliefs (e.g. P5’s discussion of research that supports diagnostic 
validity). In S2 participants attempted to integrate conflicting information but then ignored it 
because of dissonance (reducing the importance of cognitions that create dissonance). In S3, 
participants were more aware of this dissonance and rejected diagnosis in favour of 
psychological approaches (changing their attitudes, beliefs and behaviours). Therefore, the 
ways they used diagnosis reduced dissonance as well as uncertainty in practice. 
Further, cognitive theory about tolerating uncertainty is relevant here. Tolerance of 
uncertainty is a concept used in psychological understandings of anxiety and suggests that a 
core feature of worry is inability to tolerate uncertainty (Davey & Wells, 2006). Perhaps here, 
the pressure of the job caused worry and a quest for certainty and so the perception of these 
secure foundations (diagnosis, the team, psychological models) as certain and dependable is a 
protection against uncertainty. Uncertainty and dissonance are ignored, foundations become 
reified as empirical, rather than based on subjective opinion (Timimi, 2011b) and these 
foundations in turn go unchallenged, which in part explains why diagnosis remains 
influential. 




Attachment. Practitioners’ need for a certain foundation fits in with the concept of a 
secure base in attachment theory. A consistent attachment figure, according to attachment 
theory, offers a secure base so that a child can develop independence, being able to explore 
its environment with a secure base to rely on in response to threat, allowing regulation of 
distress (Bowlby, 1980; 1988). 
It seems that these participants quested for a secure base from which to practise; 
attachments to those bases can be conceptualised in terms of secure, preoccupied and 
ambivalent attachments (Main & Solomon, 1986). Those in S1 could be considered to have a 
preoccupied attachment to diagnosis; they accommodated inconsistent views about diagnosis 
and treated it as a secure base, driven by the need for a certain foundation. Those in S2 were 
perhaps ambivalently attached to diagnosis; these participants did not fully reject diagnosis 
and were inconsistent in their use of it as a secure base, sometimes using their team. Those in 
S3 seemed to believe they had found a secure base in their psychological models, but the 




Protective depersonalisation. As seen in the findings, using diagnosis as a 
foundation for practice can result in the depersonalisation of PRPD, which is protective for 
participants, allowing them to disengage with distress and the ethical complexity of their 
work, something suggested by CPs discussing diagnosis in Christofides et al.’s (2011) study 
and by Dillon (2013), who claims clinical terminology “enables a distancing” (p. 16). It can 
be argued that this is an understandable reaction to working in such a pressured system. 
Therefore, any approach that moves away from diagnosis requires understanding that 
diagnosis can be protective and, as Dillon (2013) suggests, developing systems that 
“adequately support mental health professionals to bear witness to the pain of people who 




have endured terrible things” (p.17). CPs are perhaps well placed to offer supervision to cope 
with this potentially additional distress. Tolerating uncertainty may be key here, allowing a 
position of “safe uncertainty” for clinicians and PRPD, where alternative meanings and 
explanations can sit alongside, not subsume, each other (Mason, 1993). It may also be 
important to encourage practitioners to reflect on the frameworks they are using and the 
consequences of using them. 
Considerations for Clinical Psychologists. The CP role has moved beyond 
individual work towards supervision, training and consultation (BPS, 2007). This will be 
vitally important if psychological approaches are to be integrated within mental health 
services as approaches that stand up alongside diagnosis as accessible to those not trained in 
such approaches (those in S1 and S2), through consultation and training. As discussed in the 
introduction, team formulation is one way for CPs to promote alternative approaches, 
however, current findings support the claim that practitioners are largely unaware of 
psychological or other alternative explanations for distress (BPS, 2014), unless they have 
been directly trained in them. 
Research about CPs’ work in teams could provide clues about its lack of influence. 
 
Christofides et al. (2011), in their study of clinical psychologists’ use of formulation in teams, 
found that CPs work by informally ‘chipping in’ ideas based on formulation and 
psychological theory, to avoid taking an expert position. However, participants in the 
Summers (2006) study felt some of the hypotheses in team formulation were too speculative; 
perhaps then they did not offer enough of a certain foundation for practice. This is difficult to 
negotiate, given that participants in the Hollingworth and Johnstone (2014) study liked that 
no one took the expert position in the team formulation process. Perhaps then, CPs need to 
promote psychological models as practice frameworks that are as useful as diagnosis and 




show confidence using these approaches to manage risk, whilst acknowledging the expertise 
of other clinicians. 
Offering alternative frameworks does not have to become a battle against diagnosis; 
using them with diagnosis (with cautions about its perceived certainty) would move towards 
an approach that does not seek to “replace one paradigm with another” (Bracken et al., 2012, 
p. 432). However, as Berger (2011) suggests, diagnosis is widespread in thinking about 
distress so people will continue to think in terms of those categories. Therefore, given the 
dominance and power of diagnosis, CPs perhaps need clearer guidance about navigating 
service systems when offering alternative frameworks. Existing guidance claims that a useful 
formulation can make diagnosis redundant but only aims to “establish some broad principles 
for best practice psychological formulations in order to inform the debate [about formulation 
and diagnosis]” (DCP, 2011, p. 3). The BPS could provide firmer guidance on using 
diagnosis and formulation in practice. 
Strengths and Limitations 
 
The strengths and limitations of this study are discussed in detail in the critical 
appraisal. In brief, the study has a small sample size (limited by the number of practitioners 
who volunteered to participate) and the sample was recruited from one NHS trust, which 
raises issues about theoretical saturation. Because this is a qualitative study with a relatively 
small sample, the findings cannot be widely generalised, however it has generated a number 
of further research ideas. 
Further Research 
 
The current study did not explore how practitioner views about diagnosis developed. 
 
Although demographic data were not collected, participants always talked about their 
practice discipline but this did not split participants into strands, as might have been 
hypothesised. Future research could explore the development of views about diagnosis and 








The findings of this study suggest that diagnosis has remained as a dominant 
paradigm for understanding distress partly because some practitioners rely on it to manage 
uncertainty and stress in practice and so ignore issues with its validity. This reliance subsides 
and diagnosis is abandoned only when practitioners have another model to use and feel 
secure practising within that model. These practitioners then ignore diagnosis and the 
complex impact it can have on PRPD. 
The understanding of practitioners’ work developed here suggests a need for viable 
alternatives to be used alongside diagnosis. Clinical psychologists perhaps need to have 
stronger influence in offering such alternatives, allowing practitioners to gain certainty from 
psychological models and the rationales they offer for decisions in practice. This is not an 
easy task in a system predicated on diagnosis, as P6 suggests, “things are completely skewed 
anyway in mental health, you know the spotlight’s on, what I would suggest, are maybe not 
the most helpful things.” Changes at practice, policy and a societal level would shift that 
spotlight towards more helpful ways of understanding distress. 
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Note. Broken line depicts the planned sampling method and the unbroken line depicts the 
actual sampling method. 
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Appendix 2-B 
 
Series of memos about the ‘abandoning evidence for a secure attachment’ focused code (part 
of the ‘holding and coping with inconsistent views’ category) 
Memo (following P3) 
 
All three participants seem to have a need for a secure base (an evidence base but it 
seems to go beyond this) in their practice and for some, diagnosis offers that. Diagnosis 
permeates their practice, the way they understand distress, which is clear from the way they 
talk, using medicalised language. 
There seem to be two views expressed here about diagnosis, one accepting and one 
mixed. However both express ideas about the flawed evidence base for diagnosis and 
problems with its validity (for example mentioning that people with the same diagnosis can 
present very differently). All three seem to be ignoring that evidence for some reason? They 
provide the evidence for questioning validity but don’t question that validity themselves. 
There are some potential links to attachment theory, for example needing a secure base. 
It seems that for some diagnosis offers this and maybe that’s why diagnosis can’t be criticised 
too much or dismissed outright. So information that would threaten its security doesn’t 
penetrate or affect practice. I have also noticed that there have been a lot of pauses before 
criticising diagnosis, psychiatry or any other professionals’, systems. Again perhaps this is 
the fear of upsetting the system that, for some, is disdained but relied on for certainty. 
It will be interesting to ask subsequent participants about any examples where they 
have challenged dominant practice and what made that OK (to challenge their secure base), 
as well as further exploring what they do with the information they are clearly aware of about 
concerns about validity. How can they hold two conflicting beliefs at the same time? It might 
be fruitful to ask more explicitly about their beliefs about causation in mental health but 
perhaps that risks alienating those who value diagnosis. Do they make attribution errors 




based on overvalued paradigms that offer a secure base? Albeit a false one (my belief/ 
judgement). 
Memo (following P6) 
 
Ways of coping with issues around diagnosis are becoming clearer as a result of more 
focused questioning in that area. Some seem not to bring such disagreement to light or push it 
down. However the new group that has emerged are those trained to use psychological 
models. These people prefer a psychological understanding of problems and thus are more 
rejecting of diagnosis. They seem able to do this because their model then provides the secure 
base. They have thought much more about issues of validity in diagnosis and seem to discuss 
this much more with like-minded colleagues. This seems also to help them practise in a way 
that is quite different to the medically dominated norm. 





Transcript extract with coding (P1) 
 
Data Initial coding Focused coding Category 
Respondent (R): I quite like diagnosis because it gives me a, erm, more 
clarity on the treatment pathway. Erm, I also think it’s a good explanation 
for the service users, erm, you know, I find often they feel very alone when 
they’ve got mental health problems, whereas if there’s a diagnosis, a label 
to it, it becomes less personal and they can look into that themselves and 
gain mastery over different treatment options that have helped other people 
in that situation and the support and that. Especially for things like 
personality disorder where people have felt so isolated, it kind of gives 
people a bit of hope I find. Erm, so I quite like diagnosis really. 
Interviewer (I): So in terms of your work it offers clarity about what 
pathway someone should be on (yeah) and in terms of it’s use for patients, 
it sounds like you’re kind of saying that it signposts- 
R: Yeah, so saying whilst it’s a diagnosis it’s not to say it’s all of you, it’s 
an illness that needs to be gained control of, as you would- you wouldn’t 
say ‘my name is such and such and I’m diabetic’, so gaining mastery and 
also seeing it for what it is, it’s not a reflection of the person’s character 
and personality but it is unfortunately luck of the draw; they’ve got this 
and they need to gain control over it. 
I: Yes because you also said- it’s almost like externalising it, so it makes 
them feel less alone perhaps because they’ve got a name for it and they 
know they can perhaps access support in that way. 
R: Less personal I think, there’s not a judgment that someone acts in a 
particular way or chooses a lifestyle choice to behave in a certain way, but 
they’ve got, unfortunately, a set of symptoms that fall under the umbrella 
of a particular diagnosis and this is what’s helped people in the past. 
Because I think as well in mental health it can feel so hit and miss for 
people; some medications will work for some people and not for others, 
Liking diagnosis/ 
Finding clarity on a 
treatment pathway/ 
diagnosis gives a 
good explanation to 
service users/ label 
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Separating out the 
person and the 
illness 
 
Diagnosis makes it 
less personal/ 
Diagnosis is not a 
judgment or a 
choice/ Describing 
PRPD as lacking 
agency/ Diagnosis 
leads to treatment/ 
Treatment as hit 
Justifying the use of 
diagnosis based on 
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Impact on practice: 
depersonalisation 
 





with no clear way of saying ‘this is definitely going to work for you’. So 
again it just makes it less personal, people can be more objective and see 
their illness as something they need to manage, control and learn to live 
with, rather than, erm, you know sitting themselves at home and saying 
‘I’m a terrible person, everyone hates me, sort of thing’. 
I: And what do you think about, well what’s your experience of the 
diagnostic process as it is at the moment, in the NHS or in your team? 
R: Erm, our doctor’s very good I think at reaching an appropriate 
diagnosis, he doesn’t leap into a diagnosis. Because most people want a 
name for it as soon as they come in and he will do, erm, a … get people to 
keep some diaries and for the care coordinators to spend a period of time 
assessing that person, but he’s also not shy of giving a diagnosis if it’s 
obvious, you know, erm. I’ve found that the hardest diagnoses to get are 
ones of personality disorder. I think historically, as well, it was seen as a 
diagnosis of exclusion, a lot of very kind doctors don’t want someone to be 
left without a service, so they might suggest that it’s some kind of mood 
disorder. I find that unhelpful because the treatment pathways are quite 
different. I also think that, erm, erm, for people that have say a personality 
disorder, if they’ve already presented with several different ways they 
might have had several different diagnoses before we even get to that point 
and that can be quite invalidating for somebody and quite hard to establish 
a therapeutic relationship with, when they’ve already got preconceived 
ideas about what illness they might be suffering from. Yeah. 
I: So psychiatrists are reluctant to give some kinds of diagnoses and it 
comes from a place of kindness? 
R: I think with some, not with all. You know we’re still trying to change a 
culture really and seeing that as something that can be controlled and 
treated. 
I: And I suppose thinking about that, erm, the culture that is perhaps 
around personality disorder, or was, that it cannot be treated and thinking 
about wider stigma about mental illness in society and what people have to 
put up with when they’ve been given that diagnosis. Does that come up 
and miss/ Seeking a 
treatment that 
works/ Diagnosis 
makes it less 
personal/ Seeing the 
illness as separate to 
the person gives 
control over it/ 
Seeing the illness as 





diagnosis can be 
reached/ Patients 
want a name/ 
Diagnosis can be 
obvious/ Some 
diagnoses harder to 
get/ Believing 
kindness of doctor 
affects diagnosis 
given/ Considering 
stigma/ Relying on 
clarity of diagnosis 
for treatment 
pathways/ ignoring 
questions of validity 
linked to changing 
diagnoses/ PRPD 
have preconceived 
ideas about their 
illness/ believing the 
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Impact on practice: (not 
challenging diagnosis, not 









with  your  clients  at  all?  Do  they  experience  stigma  because  of  the 
diagnosis that they’ve got? 
R: Yeah I think so and especially with personality disorder when people 
tend to judge themselves and stigmatise themselves. As soon as they start 
to go on the internet and googling things, that can make people panic a lot 
really but I find that if you’ve explained it properly, if anything it’s a 
source of support from people; that they can sort of separate themselves 
from the overwhelming feelings that they have and get the appropriate 
treatment for it. So… yeah. 
I: So it sounds like you’re saying there’s a self stigma as well? (Yeah, 
yeah). The ideas that people get from whoever about what people with 
personality disorder are like, they kind of internalise it 
R: Oh yeah, yeah definitely and then perpetuating that self invalidation 
and the invalidation from people around them as well. Usually it’s had 
such an impact on people’s lives, it’s so chaotic that it’s not terribly 
validating. I think diagnosis can be good in that way that it, if it’s 
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Initial (line by line) coding Focused Coding Category 
Diagnosis giving certainty 
Finding certainty in model 
Seeking certainty 
Seeking treatment that works 
Experiencing uncertainty 
Questing for certainty 
Needing a certain foundation for practice 
 
Using physical health metaphor 
Ignoring evidence that questions validity 
Contradicting previously expressed views 
Holding views in mind 
 
Expressing inconsistent views 
Coping with inconsistent views 
 
Holding and coping with inconsistent and differing 
views 
 
Believing in the need to explain diagnosis 
Ignoring diagnosis in practice 
Not realising negative consequences of diagnosis 
Making difficult decisions based on diagnosis 
 
Depersonalising their client 
Making difficult decisions 
Ignoring diagnosis 
 
Impact on practice: depersonalisation and not 
challenging diagnosis 
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In this critical appraisal I will present a review of the research process. I will offer an initial 
recap of the results of the research paper to orientate the reader. Second, further findings 
about the role of psychology and power will be considered. Third, I will discuss the 
challenges of developing an epistemological position. Then I will review the limitations of 
this project, more specifically the challenges of using a grounded theory (GT) methodology 
within the context of the National Health Service (NHS) and the requirements of a 
Doctorate in Clinical Psychology thesis. Reflections are offered about how conducting this 
research has shaped and been shaped by my continuing clinical practice and finally, using 
diagnosis in research is explored. 
Summary of findings 
 
The aim of this thesis was to develop a GT to explain how diagnosis is used in adult 
mental health practice. The findings suggest that the pressure of the job felt by participants 
(due mostly to workload and risk) led to anxiety and uncertainty, which drove them to seek 
a certain foundation for their work to decrease this uncertainty. Participants split into three 
strands according to what they used to gain this certainty. Those in strand one (S1) used 
diagnosis, those in strand two (S2) used their team and those in strand three (S3) used 
psychological models they had been trained in. Participants in all strands expressed 
inconsistent views about the validity, reliability and utility of diagnosis, which were dealt 
with in different ways. Those in S1 ignored those views, those in S2 mostly ignored them 
and those in S3 realised their inconsistency but held those views in mind in order to explore 
them. 
The GT illuminates how diagnosis affected practice. For those in S1 and S2, 
diagnosis allowed depersonalisation of ‘people in receipt of a psychiatric diagnosis’ (PRPD) 
in order to create emotional distance from them when making difficult decisions. The GT 
also explains why diagnosis remained dominant despite inconsistent views about it; no 








Where was psychology? The role of psychology was only discussed by half of 
participants (all were asked about it but some did not know enough to discuss it), so there 
was not enough data to justify a separate category, so those data is discussed here. 
Participants in S2 discussed a desire to depart from the medical model. There was 
recognition of the value of psychology and formulation; “It always opens up doors for me as 
well and it really helps me understand somebody a bit better and once you’ve got that 
formulation and thinking of different ways of approaching, you know, dealing with certain 
challenges” (P8). However, access to psychology was difficult due to long waiting lists and 
there was difficulty managing risk whilst waiting (“it’s about sort of managing risk in 
between” [P7]), which meant other treatment options were used instead. 
One participant noted there was a power in diagnosis that psychologists did not have 
(P4 states “she’s [the psychologist] not the one that’s putting the diagnosis down, even 
though she can disagree quite strongly with the psychiatrist”), creating a sense that the 
frameworks they advocate for cannot be as influential as diagnosis. This power imbalance 
between CPs and psychiatrists has been noted by Smail (1996), who suggests that lack of 
power to diagnose and coerce may put CPs in weaker professional standing but in a strong 
position to form positive relationships with PRPD. It would seem diagnosis is revered over 
formulation, giving more power to those who can do the former and so psychology’s ability 
to influence is constrained in the ways mentioned above. 
Power. Professional, systemic and individual power was an important concern 
running through this research. Conducting this research, I hoped to redress the professional 
power imbalance created by diagnosis somewhat, giving professionals a voice when 
considering these dominant paradigms, which does not happen currently; professions other 




than psychiatry do not have significant input into revisions of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) (Aitchison & Mellsop, 2010) and clinical psychologists 
(CPs) are the only professional group represented in the British Psychological Society’s 
(BPS) Division of Clinical Psychology’s (DCP) working party (BPS, 2013). I also believe 
that, given the importance of therapeutic relationships in outcomes for PRPD (Castonguay 
& Beutler, 2006), the way staff approach their work and the frameworks they bring to it are 
important to consider in research. 
The power of working within a framework dominated by the DSM, now in its fifth 
edition (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013), has been articulated by Simblett 
(2013); 
People who are caught by DSM discourse (including myself) are always in a relation 
to power and that discourse acts on people by creating a limited field of possible 
actions and responses. People are themselves capable of a much greater field of 
possible actions and responses than that imposed by any particular discourse. 
Perhaps not an infinite one, but one that nevertheless is much, much greater than 
those posed by any single discourse. Not only that, but the ability to do resistance is 
always present for people (p. 116). 
Considering power in this research has allowed me to see that participants were acting in 
understandable ways, according to the situations they were in. It feels like the power of 
diagnosis was so strong, those who did resist diagnosis were somewhat powerless anyway. 
S2 participants discussed how challenging diagnosis seemed pointless because often that 
diagnosis did not change (the power is with the diagnosing clinician) and those in S3 who 
rejected diagnosis avoided discussing their views about it, because again they felt that 
discussion was pointless because of the power of the paradigm. Simblett (2013) suggested 
increasing uncertainty about DSM ideas and discourses might take away some of its power. 




However, the findings of the research paper show that uncertainty about diagnosis is ignored 
by some in practice because it is relied on as a certain foundation for practice. 
Those in S3 understood the uncertainty about diagnosis and chose then to ignore it in 
their practice. Chambers, MacDonald and Mikes-Liu (2013) suggest that coming across 
issues relating to diagnosis can be “emotionally charged” for some clinicians (p. 131) 
touching on personal and professional values as well as power inequalities (they give the 
example of differential pay scales and weight given to the opinions of different 
professionals). Chambers et al. argue that clinicians feel particularly negative when they are 
forced to work within a diagnostic framework that goes against their professional training or 
values and they describe cutting off from others with differing views or frameworks as a 
way of coping with emotional reactivity to disagreement, which was the response of 
participants in this study who did not debate diagnosis. Chambers et al. apply this to PRPD 
also, concerned that hearing contrasting opinions from PRPD and their families might make 
it difficult to work with them or really hear their perspectives. Power imbalances and the 
emotion attached to these issues for participants were clear but not explored explicitly in this 
research and may be useful to explore in future research, as well as interpersonal processes 
in interactions with others with differing views. 
Developing an epistemological position 
 
I have found inherent challenges in using qualitative paradigms, working in a system 
(the NHS) and a society that views knowledge in a predominantly positivistic way; truth is 
found by means of logic, science and thus quantitative paradigms. I recognised this when 
discussing this research with colleagues (nurses, social workers and CPs) and was asked 
‘can you really claim to have a model based on 10 participants?’ This taught me the 
importance of having faith in my methodology and being clear on my own epistemological 
position. 




I first started to develop my own epistemological position as an undergraduate. I 
read Hacking’s (1986) essay Making Up People, which presents a form of dynamic 
nominalism that started to solidify my ideas about how important language is in how we 
understand other people and, most importantly, how they understand themselves. Hacking 
suggests mental health problems have essentially been made up, or invented, by labeling 
existing behaviours and when we create such a label “the category and the people in it 
emerge hand in hand” (p. 165). He argues that there are no ‘real’ entities awaiting scientific 
discovery but new realities are made possible by our descriptions. As Hacking discusses, 
these were ideas that had existed for some time but his writing was my first exposure to 
them. 
Another important concept for me, which I was introduced to during my social work 
training, was the social model of disability (e.g. Oliver & Sapey, 2006). Much has been 
written and theorised about that model but, in short, it presents the idea that impairment (for 
example, experiencing unusual beliefs or ‘psychosis’) does not disable someone. Instead, it 
is society’s reaction to that person and their impairment that disables them (for example, 
fear in response to someone expressing unusual beliefs). I have held onto this somewhat 
simple but seminal idea throughout my career in mental health social work and more 
recently during CP training. 
These ideas are inherently social constructionist and that epistemological stance has 
underpinned this research and influenced the choice of a social contructivist GT method 
(Charmaz, 2006), which acknowledges the GT that develops through interviews was co- 
constructed, through narratives or conversation, by me and my participants. Charmaz (2006) 
criticises traditional social constructionist GT for not acknowledging the role of the 
researcher in this construction of data. However, the idea about having no ultimate truth to 
uncover in research and reality being constructed through interactions, made it difficult to 




convince my colleagues, in the example above, about the value of this research. 
 
In my clinical work, over the course of training, I have understood the similarities 
between PRPD. Despite how their distress has been labeled, PRPD I have seen clinically 
have experienced some type of trauma, with the link between trauma and distress now well 
researched (e.g. Hammersley et al., 2013; Luntz & Widom, 1994). Their distress (or 
‘symptoms’) is also real, regardless of the narratives they use to describe it. So how could 
this fit with Hacking’s (1986) idea that the way we describe others creates ways for them to 
be, or social model ideas that it is society’s reaction to impairment that creates disability? 
Surely if it were this simple, offering a different narrative (formulation) or a less disabling 
response would alleviate distress. However this is not always the case and sometimes 
distress remains after offering formulation, for example. This is when I started to look 
beyond social constructionism to critical realism. 
A realist would argue that there are definite things existing in the world that we have 
“come to recognize and classify correctly” (Hacking, 1986, p. 164). Throughout training I 
have increasingly noticed that PRPD can also, some more easily than others, be seen to fit 
certain categories. There are similarities in how distress is communicated, which are not 
necessarily well explained or described by diagnosis. For example, the content of 
‘delusional ideas’ is often similar between PRPD and I believe this is how services learn to 
help people, by noticing that some communications of distress are similar to others and 
finding what works for groups of people. It could be argued that this is how evidence bases 
and classification systems develop and that if diagnosis is abandoned, it will be replaced by 
another classification system, which could have negative consequences similar to diagnosis. 
Perhaps this is due to our inherent need for social categorisation; categorising people into 
certain groups based on simplified characteristics (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). 
Critical realism suggests that reality can only be imperfectly known and so findings 




about that reality can only be probably true (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). There are similarities 
between critical realism and Hacking’s (1986) “two vectors” of labeling (p. 168). Hacking 
contends that “labeling from above” comes from those in an expert position who create 
potential realities that “some people make their own”. The second vector, labeling “from 
below” is “the autonomous behavior of the person so labeled”, which creates a reality that 
experts must take into account. Critical realism, similarly, sees reality as outside our current 
understanding, therefore we cannot explain everything and must accept the reality of, for 
example, distress, but also understands that we cannot fully know; reality includes powers 
and processes that operate in potential, not just those that are represented in actual events 
(Pilgrim, 2015). Therefore, not all distress will fit into the constructs we have available 
(thanks to the person operating in the second vector), thus creating the uncertainty in 
practice, which was an issue for the participants in this study. 
However there is a tension in this thesis, with the research paper defending a 
 
constructivist position and epistemological concerns and the focus in this paper on the utility 
 
of critical realism, which has an ontological emphasis. As Guba and Lincoln suggest, 
 
“interweaving” or “borrowing” different aspects of ontological and epistemological stances 
 
is possible (2005, p. 197) and I continue to do this throughout my work. It seems that, whilst 
 
conducting research, epistemological concerns were greater but when reflecting on this 
 
research and its wider context, ontological concerns predominated and furthered my journey 
 
in considering my own ontological and epistemological views. The tension between the 
 
social constructivist stance of the research paper and, for example, using attachment theory 
 
to contextualise some findings, is an example of this. The use of attachment theory is also 
 
perhaps an example of the need for pragmatism within the constraints of the Doctorate in 
 
Clinical Psychology Thesis and its requirement to apply existing theory to findings. 
Critical realist ideas have helped me in discussing research in a positivistic 




environment. I cannot claim that my GT is representative of the whole population sampled 
but neither could a quantitative study, because there are always realities and processes 
hidden from our methods. My aim was to present a useful snapshot but not claim 
representativeness. In clinical practice, critical realism has aided my understanding that 
distress is constructed in the narratives we use to communicate it, but this is not the whole 
story, because distress is part of people’s realities and not all of reality can be known. In 
practical terms, this has taught me that formulation cannot explain everything and that 
perhaps the key to making all systems of understanding (diagnosis or formulation, for 
example) more humane, is to treat them all as provisional; Pilgrim (2015) suggests that a 
critical realist formulation would be “tentative, as inclusive as possible and revisable” 
(p.298). 
The challenges of becoming a grounded theorist 
 
Theoretical saturation and sampling. The issue of data saturation is contested in 
GT. Some scholars argue that data collection should continue until theoretical saturation is 
reached, where there are no new properties of categories emerging (Glaser, 1978). Dey 
(1999) has offered an alternative to saturation, ‘theoretical sufficiency’, arguing saturation 
implies that all categories have been exhausted but this idea is not in line with a 
constructivist epistemology; saturation is not possible because the aim is not to provide an 
objective truth and the findings represent the researcher’s understanding, not the only 
possible understanding, of the data. This is supported by Charmaz (2006) who suggests that 
interviewing should cease when the data has provided sufficient theoretical insights. 
However, others argue that theoretical integration should be the goal for GT, where the 
theory provides a comprehensive explanation of the processes apparent in relation to the 
phenomenon under study (Birks & Mills, 2011). 
As discussed in the method section of the research paper, the number of participants 




interviewed was the number of participants who volunteered for the study, which limited the 
ability to reach theoretical sufficiency. Due to the time limits of the thesis, recruitment only 
took place within one trust (although the participant pool was approximately 150 people). I 
felt that the categories were sufficient and integrated after 10 participants, however I would 
have liked to have recruited more participants to test the categories further and perhaps offer 
more richness and depth to them. Theoretical sufficiency could have been improved by 
conducting second interviews with staff, however there were concerns from R&D and 
service managers about how much staff time the research was going to take up and therefore 
second interviews were not agreed as part of recruitment. 
Despite this, I feel able to conclude that the categories are sufficient and integrated 
 
(although not ‘saturated’) and therefore the sample size and sampling strategy were 
 
sufficient to achieve this. This conclusion can be drawn because the study has met its 
 
primary aim, which was to develop a GT to explain how diagnosis is used in practice. The 
 
resulting GT meets this aim, and although the study does not perhaps meet the more 
 
positivist aim of saturation, it has provided a GT, which gives an abstract understanding of 
 
the area of study, theorising patterns and connections between categories, to offer an 
 




Recruitment efforts were time consuming and challenging. I sent the follow up 
recruitment emails and chased up those who expressed an interest but did not follow up in 
arranging an interview (two potential participants). I also made phone calls and wrote emails 
to team managers asking if I could go to team meetings to present the research proposal and 
recruit, however only one manager allowed me to do this, most citing team pressures and the 
preciousness of teams’ time together. 




As mentioned in the discussion of the research paper, theoretical sampling was not 
possible, due to the time constraints of the project and collecting demographic data 
compromising anonymity. As discussed above, further recruitment would have been ideal to 
test out the categories further and theoretical sampling could have extended the results. For 
example, focusing recruitment on those who had been trained in psychology models to 
further test out that strand. 
Another issue was that the plan to sample an equal number of participants from all 
nine CCTTs in the trust did not come to fruition because all those who volunteered to take 
part were interviewed, representing seven teams. This sampling strategy was planned to 
account for differences in team cultures but this did not seem to be an issue, with 
heterogeneous experiences coming from participants from the same teams. Thus despite the 
challenges I faced around recruitment I believe that the study has produced a robust GT and 
a valuable contribution to knowledge. 
Further methodological limitations. It would have been interesting and useful to 
consider the impact of the professional affiliation of study participants on the way diagnosis 
was used. As discussed in the research paper, it would have been particularly useful to 
consider what factors affect which strand practitioners align with. However, professional 
discipline did not seem to help explain the findings, as discussed in the research paper it was 
not the case that nurses occupied one strand and social workers another. If the study had 
been larger and spread over another trust, more detailed demographics could have been 
considered to look at their possible impact on use of diagnosis. However, collecting and 
reporting demographic data in this study would have surely compromised the anonymity of 
the professionals who participated. 
The GT constructed here is based on 10 participants’ perspectives and the 
researcher’s analysis of these perspectives. Therefore it is important to acknowledge that the 




findings represent one construction of the data forged within the context and conditions of 
the study. It is hoped that this GT can be further tested and expanded on in future research. 
For example, it might be useful to consider further, how use of psychiatric diagnosis in 
practice impacts on referral rates to psychology, for practitioners in different strands. 
The impact of research on practice and of practice on research 
 
Throughout training I have noticed a tension between my academic knowledge and 
what is possible or what works in practice. For example, how do I use the understanding 
about diagnosis gained in my literature review whilst practising in a system where diagnosis 
is necessary? The issue of power in this research has led me to consider how feasible the 
idea of challenging the use of diagnosis at a systemic level is, given that the whole system is 
structured around diagnosis. If I believe that diagnosis has a damaging impact on PRPD, 
how do I find a common language to clinically discuss distress with colleagues in an 
environment where medical language dominates? 
The truth is this is very difficult and I consider recent DCP guidance (DCP, 2015) 
idealistic and too far removed from the conversations happening at ground level. However, 
what I have realised and reflected on in this research process, is that I can use labels to 
describe what someone’s experience might be like but I can do that in a compassionate way. 
For example, if someone experiencing distress has been labeled as having ‘antisocial 
personality disorder’, according to the DSM-5 (APA, 2013) they would have a ‘pathological 
personality trait’ of ‘manipulativeness’. If I understand this as a label, or a social 
construction, in practice I can offer another conceptualisation. For example I can encourage 
the view that ‘manipulative’ behaviour represents a resourceful pattern someone has 
developed to get their need met, which can leave others feeling manipulated; their response, 
not necessarily the person’s intention. I often challenge the ‘manipulative’ label without 




single handedly trying to eradicate it; I find it more useful to use and unpack diagnostic 
terms. 
Diagnosis and research 
 
The issue of using diagnostic categories to organise qualitative and quantitative 
research is, as mentioned in the discussion of the literature review, one that needs to be 
addressed more fully by CP as a profession. In the planning of this thesis, discussions were 
had about the issues of considering diagnosis as a whole phenomenon in both the literature 
review and the research paper, rather than studying a single diagnostic category, for 
example. In response to such discussion, I looked to the literature for guidance and found 
some discussion in Clinical Psychology Forum, the DCP’s monthly publication. Gill, Mullin 
and Simpson (2013), in a brief opinion piece, discuss this issue in relation to quantitative 
research, with the suggestion that “methodologies which place a greater emphasis upon 
psychological conceptualisations of problems rather than diagnostic clustering can and 
should be implemented” (p. 30). 
Although the focus was on diagnosis in this study, focusing on it as a whole and 
problematic concept was an attempt to better understand it and therefore use it in more 
helpful ways. In the literature review, I attempted to look at diagnosis as a whole to bring 
together research that had been assigned to diagnostic categories in order to break down 
those artificial barriers and make those findings more useful. In the research study, I wanted 
to move away from arguments about categories and their utility to try to understand why 
diagnosis, as an organising principle, has prevailed. Focusing on one or two diagnostic 
categories would not have allowed those aims to be met. 
Final Reflections 
 
I undertook this project because of an interest in why diagnosis has remained so 
powerful despite being so heavily criticised, believing that the answer would lie in the work 




of practitioners at ground level. I have learned about the importance of having a certain 
foundation from which to practice, similar to the ‘safe base’ (Bowlby, 1988) in attachment 
theory and how this is created in sometimes unhelpful ways in the chaos of mental health 
practice. The intricacies of this need for practitioners and the entanglement of diagnosis in 
mental health practice mean that, in my opinion, any drive to replace diagnosis with another 
paradigm, eradicating it completely, is wasted energy. As Chambers et al. (2013) point out, 
it is difficult to practise in a system where “different paradigms compete for validation, 
power and finance” (p. 140). Perhaps clinical psychology as a profession should move away 
from seeking that validation, power and finance, towards developing ways of working that 
are more useful for practitioners and PRPD. 
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( ), to all CCTT team managers, who will be asked to disseminate it to all care 
coordinators, asking people to express an interest in taking part in the study, attaching the 
participant information sheet for more information and asking them to email back the principal 
investigator with their name and contact details. 
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 A qualitative study of practitioner perspectives on psychiatric diagnosis    
Applicant/ Principal Investigator: Rebecca Hough (Trainee Clinical Psychologist,  Lancaster University/ ).  
Supervisor: 
   .  
Field Supervisor: 
   .  
Supervisor: 
   .    Introduction  
Current debate 
 The British Psychological Society’s (BPS) Division of Clinical Psychology (DCP) has released a position statement about the shifting paradigm of psychiatric diagnosis (PD) in mental health (BPS, 2013). This states that rather than using reductive diagnostic categories as set out in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders V (APA, 2013), clinical psychologists (CPs) and other mental health professionals need to develop a framework of understanding for mental distress that is based on                 understanding human experience, moving beyond the current disease model. This statement urges such shifts because the current framework has a detrimental impact on service users (SUs; BPS, 2013). The DCP has set up a working committee to develop an alternative to the diagnostic system that takes account of these issues, however the practitioners who will be implementing and adjusting to any changes in the 
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 There is an existing body of research that explores service user experience of PD, usually focusing on a specific PD (e.g. Pitt, Kilbride, Welford, Nothard & Morrison, 2009). This research largely shows that PD offers a conflict of experience for SUs; it is seen as both offering hope and validation, at the same time as being pejorative and leading to stigma (Leeming, Boyle, & Macdonald, 2009). There is very little research directly exploring staff’s views on or use of psychiatric diagnosis. The only existing qualitative study is by Probst (2013), who conducted a US study investigating social workers’ use of diagnostic and environmental perspectives in their work in mental health. The findings suggest a ‘tightrope’ between exaggerating problems associated with diagnosis in order to meet diagnostic criteria and access services and minimising the pathologisation of what social workers saw as problems of living. The findings suggest that diagnosis offers a starting point for intervention but the moulding of presenting problems to fit into pre- defined categories left participants feeling ethically compromised. The findings of this study appeared to be heavily influenced by the US healthcare system due to the need for 
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   a PD to access insurance. Scott and Sembi (2006) make an academic argument that diagnosis should be used as a way of identifying initial hypotheses that should be idiosyncratic and tested but it is as yet unclear how practitioners use diagnosis in practice in the UK NHS. 
The service context of therapy 
 Research into the efficacy of psychological therapies indicates that the therapeutic alliance between practitioner and service user is the most robust indicator of positive therapeutic outcomes across treatment modalities and clinical presentations (Castonguay & Beutler, 2006). Rogers, Pilgrim and Lacey (1993) found that many SUs valued the human aspects of their contacts with professionals (feeling listened to,  treated with kindness and respect) rather than technical expertise exhibited. Therefore  it is important to understand what frameworks of understanding various professionals bring to their SUs as this could influence the therapeutic alliance and the direction of treatment. This is particularly important for mental health services where the SU may form a number of therapeutic alliances, for example with their care coordinator (CC) and their clinical psychologist, who may be working with those SUs concurrently.   
Clinical psychology in the service context 
 There is an increasing emphasis on CPs being able to work with and influence adult mental health teams in a consultation and training role, to try to maximize the use of psychologists within the NHS (Lavender & Hope, 2007; BPS 2007a; 2007b). This means that CPs need a good understanding of staff teams in order to influence them. As posited by Gill, Mullin and Simpson (2013), PD provides a “joint narrative between systems” and it is the role of the CP to offer a psychological understanding of such narratives. If new frameworks for understanding in mental health are recommended, a 
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   degree of change will be inevitable for practitioners. Cognitive analytic therapy explains that change has to be encouraged within a person’s ‘zone of proximal development’ (ZPD), which means that any new learning or change needs to be close enough to what the person already knows to be palatable (Ryle & Kerr, 2002). As a profession we need to know what that ZPD is at ground level in order to affect change.   
Current study 
 This study will use qualitative inquiry to consider the views of care coordinators (CCs) working in adult mental health settings at ground level, those who perhaps would not get an opportunity to be part of the DCP working party. If a legitimate alternative to PD is offered by the DCP, these staff will have to adjust to any changes that this might bring. Therefore it is important to understand their own experiences of and views on using PD in mental health practice, in order to understand what functions and qualities a new approach will need to retain in order to be palatable at practice level. This will aid the current debate about how CPs can deliver an alternative to PD that is more likely to be taken on board by non-psychology NHS staff. This will also enable CPs to engage with clients more effectively as they will have an understanding of the frameworks of understanding that are being perpetuated by their CCs. This study will produce a grounded theory for clinical practice; answering the call to examine “values, relationships, politics and the ethical basis of care and caring” (Bracken et al, 2012, p. 432). This study will deal with a real concern of its participants and CPs, not only serving an academic interest; a key purpose for any grounded theory study (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Grounded theory will help in developing a theoretical understanding of the processes associated with the use of PD in practice. This will also support CPs to engage with CCs at a consultative level, having a better understanding of 
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   their views on PD, enabling CPs to pitch their discussions with CCs from a shared understanding, to perhaps influence and change that understanding.   
Research Questions 
 What is the experience of NHS staff working with PD in NHS secondary adult mental health services?   
Aim 
 To explore the experience of staff working with PD in the NHS.    Method  
Design and participants 
 This is a qualitative study with a sample of at least eight participants from different backgrounds who are currently working as CCs in adult secondary mental health services. Using a grounded theory methodology, it is difficult to predict what sample size will be needed to achieve theoretical saturation, however eight to 24 participants is the range suggested by Riley (1996) to achieve data saturation. In the first instance participants will be recruited from the nine complex care and treatment teams (CCTTs) in , widening out recruitment to another trust if needed. It is acknowledged that secondary mental health services in this locality are undergoing service changes, like much of the NHS. Therefore recruitment will take place from these teams as they exist at the time, which may be under a different name, but they will still employ CCs. Purposive sampling of a balanced number of participants from each team will attempt to allow for the potential influence of certain working cultures within teams, which may influence views on psychiatric diagnosis. 
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Procedure 
 Following ethical and R & D approval, an email (see Appendix 4-A) will be sent from the PI, via the field supervisor, to all CCTT team managers, who will be asked to disseminate it to all CCs, inviting people to express an interest in taking part in the study, attaching the participant information sheet for more information (see Appendix 4-B)  and asking them to email back the PI with their name and contact details if they are interested in taking part. Alongside recruitment, the principal investigator (PI) will endeavour to visit all 9 teams to talk at the team meetings to give a brief overview of the research, to try to maximize recruitment. It is acknowledged this may not be possible for all teams, for a number of reasons. For example, infrequency of team meetings where time is precious may mean that managers do not want to allocate time for the PI to speak. The PI will approach team managers to request a slot for the PI to speak at their team meeting. There will be an initial block of data collection, followed by a pause in data collection to allow for data analysis and the initial development of the draft grounded theory. A second block of data collection will allow exploration of gaps in this model. In both blocks of data collection, an attempt will be made to get an even spread of staff from each team. However it is acknowledged that this may not be possible and it may, for example, be a possibility that the majority of participants come from the teams that the field supervisor has most contact with. Following any expressions of interest, the PI will email back participants thanking them for their interest and informing them     that an interview date will be arranged if necessary (see Appendix 4-C). The PI will try to sample a similar number of participants from each team.  Interviews will be arranged with those participants. If there is a disappointing response 
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   from initial emailing, a second email will be sent and a third, if needed, after the initial data collection block. If there are more declarations of interest than participants needed, an email will be sent informing those who have not been selected to take part of the same (Appendix 4-D). At interview participants will be given time to read the participant information sheet if needed (Appendix 4-B) and asked to sign the consent form (Appendix 4-E). They will be asked if they would like to receive a summary of the research. They will also be reminded not to disclose any names of service users; if this happens inadvertently this information will be removed from the written transcript. If they opt in to this their email address will be taken for the dissemination list. The research summary will be sent after the thesis has been examined. The dissemination list will be kept electronically on the University server, password protected and destroyed following the dissemination of participant summaries. Only when they have signed the consent form will the interview begin. Data will be collected using semi-structured interviews, approximately 1 hour in duration, asking staff to reflect on their experience of using psychiatric diagnosis in practice (see Appendix 4-F for interview schedule). As a grounded theory methodology will be used and data analysis completed after each block of interviews, as interviews go on the interview schedule may change to allow the PI the chance to direct questioning towards areas of interest. Throughout the interview the interviewer may keep notes for their own understanding and may check this understanding or link themes, checking these conclusions with the participant. Interviews will be digitally recorded on a portable digital recording device. Following the interview the data will be uploaded onto Lancaster University’s server. 
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   The transfer of the file onto computer will be completed as soon as possible following the interview and the data file will then be deleted from the portable device. The interviews will then be transcribed verbatim by the principal investigator, with transcripts kept on the university server. Consent forms will be scanned in and saved on the university server. After the thesis has been examined, a file containing transcripts and consent forms will be encrypted and sent to the research coordinator of the course for long term digital storage. Following the examination of the project, the PI will delete the audio files. Supervisors may access transcribed interviews to support data analyses. An anonymised data file of the transcripts and consent forms will be kept on the Lancaster University server for up to ten years following submission of the report. Data Analysis  Grounded theory will be used to analyse the data gathered. The wide focus here on psychiatric diagnosis could give a diverse set of data as practitioners will have a range of experiences and influences. Therefore using grounded theory should allow focus on specific emerging issues as data are collected and analysed. The aim is to create a grounded theory explaining the utility of psychiatric diagnosis for NHS staff. This is an inductive approach to data collection, taking a constructivist approach to grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006). An initial attempt will be made to develop categories which illuminate the data, followed by an attempt to saturate those categories with appropriate cases to demonstrate their relevance. These categories will then be developed into more general analytic theoretical frameworks, giving an account of PD that is grounded in the real world of the participants. 
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   Practical Issues  Participants will be interviewed at a location convenient for them, which is likely to be their workplace. The university will cover the cost of the PI’s travel to interview. The PI will attempt to ensure that travel time and cost is minimised, for example by interviewing staff based at the same site on one day. The course will also cover the cost of producing any materials such as printing and photocopying. The results will be fed back to all CCTTs who wish to receive feedback via team meetings and a written summary will be produced for dissemination to anyone in the Trust who expresses an interest. In the initial email to team managers, they are asked to express an interest in hearing the results of the study (see Appendix a-A).   Ethical Concerns  
Anonymity 
 As the teams are relatively small and specific within the trust anonymity of participants may be compromised and it is possible that they may be recognised from some of the information in the final report. An attempt has been made to maximise anonymity and confidentiality of interviews by pooling recruitment from all 9 teams. All results will be anonymised without the team being mentioned and no demographic data will be collected in order to preserve anonymity.   
Interviews 
 As the initial request for taking part in the study will be sent via team managers, it is possible that members of that team will feel obliged to or coerced into taking part. This should be offset by the participant information, which specifies that there is no obligation for those approached to take part. 
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   Due to the nature of interviews exploring experiences it is possible that some participants may become upset. It is also possible that the material, although work related, will hold some personal significance for them. The interviewer will take every step to support participants if this occurs and to fully debrief before returning to the workplace. If there is indication from interview that the participant is putting themselves or service users at risk the interviewer will report these concerns to the Field Supervisor and agree an action plan. This is explained in the participant information sheet (Appendix 4-B). 
Withdrawal 
 The participant information sheet (Appendix 2) indicates that the participant can withdraw from the study and specifies potential limitations to this.   Timescale  May-August 2014- Prepare and submit ethics and R & D applications. September 2014- March 2015- Collection and analysis of data. December 2014- Literature Review 1stdraft. February 2015- Literature review 2nd draft. March 2015- Research paper 1st draft. April 2014- Research paper 2nd draft. April 2015- Critical appraisal 1st draft. May 2015 Critical appraisal 2nd draft. May 2015- Hand in. This is a realistic timescale in which the data collection period may be extended if necessary. 
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Appendix 4-A 
Email to staff 
 
 
Subject line: Invitation for care coordinators to participate in research- a 
qualitative study of practitioner perspectives on psychiatric diagnosis 
 
 Dear team manager  I would be grateful if you could disseminate the email below to all care coordinators in your team. If you would like the results of this research to be presented to your team, perhaps during a team meeting, then please email me directly. Please note that the planned completion date for this project is May 2015. Kind regards Rebecca Hough Trainee Clinical Psychologist    
Dear colleague 
 
I am a Trainee Clinical Psychologist based at Lancaster University. I am writing to 
invite you to take part in a research project which I am undertaking as part of my 
training. It is being supervised by 
 
and . I am interested 
 
in exploring the experiences of staff who are care coordinators in secondary adult 
mental health services; in particular their views about and experiences of working 
with psychiatric diagnosis. If you decide to participate in the research you will be 
asked to take part in an interview with me, lasting about one hour, at a venue 
convenient for you. I have attached a participant information sheet which gives 




you more information. If you would like to take part in the research or have any 
other queries regarding it please contact me direct at r.hough@lancaster.ac.uk. 
Your research and development department and the Lancaster University 





Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
 
Lancaster University 





Participant information sheet 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
A qualitative study of practitioner perspectives on psychiatric 
diagnosis My name is Rebecca Hough and I am conducting this research as a Trainee Clinical Psychologist on the Doctorate in Clinical Psychology Course at Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom.  
What is the study about? The purpose of this study is to investigate staff experiences of working with psychiatric diagnosis in multi-disciplinary adult community mental health teams. As you may be aware, the efficacy and utility of psychiatric diagnosis is a much debated area. It is important, as part of this wider debate, to consider the opinions and experiences of staff working with diagnosis. Before the interview we will go through this sheet together and I will answer any questions you have.  
Why have I been approached? You have been approached because the study requires information from people who are care coordinators in secondary mental health care teams.  
Do I have to take part? No. It’s completely up to you to decide whether or not you take part. I will go through this information sheet with you, explaining the study and you will have to sign a consent form before being interviewed. You are free to withdraw your participation / data from the study before May 2015, which is when the research will be submitted to the University for assessment. Following this, every effort will be made to withdraw individual data up until the point of publication.  
What will I be asked to do if I take part? If you decide you would like to take part, you may be asked to come to an interview conducted by me at your workplace or other convenient venue. The interview will follow a loose structure with questions about your views on psychiatric diagnosis and experience of working with it in practice. The interview will last approximately 1 hour. In the event of over-recruitment (more people expressing an interest to take part than are needed for the study), you might not be asked to take part. Participants are being selected from all CCTTs in Lancashire and, if possible, an even spread of staff from each 
ETHICS SECTION 4-22 
   team will be achieved. If there are more staff volunteering to take part from a particular team than are needed, those who expressed an interest first will be selected. If you are not required to take part, you will receive an email informing you of this.    
Will my data be confidential? The information you provide is confidential. The interviews will be digitally recorded and then transcribed and analysed by me. The data collected for this study will be stored securely and only the researchers conducting this study will have access to this data. The typed version of your interview will be made anonymous by removing any identifying information including your name. Anonymised direct quotations from your interview may be used in the reports or publications from the study, so your name will not be attached to them. Please do not use the names of any service users. Audio recordings will be kept until the project has been examined. Anonymised written transcripts will be kept by the university for 10 years after completion of the project.  There are some limits to confidentiality: if what is said in the interview makes me think that you, or someone else, is at significant risk of harm or that your fitness to practise, or another professional’s fitness to practise, is compromised I will have to breach confidentiality and speak to my field supervisor about this. If possible, I will tell you if I have to do this.  
What will happen to the results? The results will be summarised and reported in a thesis submitted to Lancaster University and may be submitted for publication in an academic or professional journal. An accessible summary will be made available to participants, other staff members and the Trust. It is possible that the results will also be presented to the teams involved in the research, for example at team meetings.  
Are there any risks? There are no risks anticipated with participating in this study. However, if you experience any distress following participation you are encouraged to inform the researcher and contact the resources provided at the end of this sheet.  
Are there any benefits to taking part? Although you may find participating interesting, there are no direct benefits in taking part. It is hoped that the study will give an accurate picture of the experience of practitioners working with psychiatric diagnosis.  
Who has reviewed the project? This study has been reviewed by the Faculty of Health and Medicine Research Ethics Committee, and approved by the University Research Ethics Committee at Lancaster University. It is being conducted with permission from   
Where can I obtain further information about the study if I need it? If you have any questions about the study, please contact the main researcher: Rebecca Hough 
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   Trainee Clinical Psychologist Lancaster University  r.hough@lancaster.ac.uk   
  
   
Complaints If you wish to make a complaint or raise concerns about any aspect of this study and do not want to speak to the researcher, you can contact:  
  If you wish to speak to someone outside of the Clinical Psychology Doctorate Programme, you may also contact:  
  
Resources in the event of distress Should you feel distressed either as a result of taking part, or in the future, the following resources may be of assistance.  
: 
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Appendix 4-C 
 
Email to potential participants who have expressed a declaration of interest 
 
 
 Dear [name]    Thank you for expressing an interest in taking part in my research project “A qualitative study of staff perspectives on psychiatric diagnosis”. I will be in touch with you over the coming weeks to arrange an interview, or to let you know that you will not be required to participate. If you have any questions in the meantime please do not hesitate to contact me. Once again thank you for your interest.    Yours sincerely  
Rebecca Hough 
 Trainee Clinical Psychologist  Lancaster University/ 
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Appendix 4-D 
 
Email to those not selected as participants 
 Dear [name]    Once again thank you for expressing an interest in taking part in my research project “A qualitative study of staff perspectives on psychiatric diagnosis”. I am writing to let you know that, due to recruiting more people than necessary for the study from each locality, you will not be needed to participate.   Yours sincerely Rebecca Hough Trainee Clinical Psychologist  Lancaster University/ 
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 Please could you start by giving a brief overview of your job role? What are your views on PD? What are your views on the causation of mental health problems?  What do you see as the consequences of using PD in mental health practice? For service users? For practitioners? What is your experience of using PD in practice?  Do you believe that PD is a useful framework for your SUs? What does it offer as a framework? What are your professional values and how does using PD in practice fit with these values? How do you address any conflicts in values and how do these conflicts impact on your SUs and your practice? Do you think there are alternatives to PD? How do you use PD in your work? Do your views on PD or the use of PD influence your work with other professionals? How does PD influence your work with/ relationship the SU? How does PD sit with your professional views/ training?  How do you see the future of mental health care, including the use of PD and other frameworks? 
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Appendix 4-G 
 
University Research Ethics Committee Approval Letter 
 
 






R&D Trust Permission Letter 
 
 





ETHICS SECTION 4-32 
 
 
 
 
